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ARTICLES
THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF
FRANCHISE RELOCATION RESTRICTIONS
IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
Daniel E. Lazaroff*
INTRODUCTION
N December of 1981, National Football League Commissioner Pete
Rozelle testified before Congress that "[p]rofessional sports leagues are
at a point where-because of the novel business form of a sports league-
every league action, every league business judgment and every league de-
cision can be characterized as an 'antitrust' issue."' Although one might
be tempted to characterize this observation as an example of hyperbole
or overreaction, it is not altogether without foundation.
There can be no doubt that contemporary professional sports activities
are indeed "big business." 2 Such significant commercial endeavors will
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. 1971, State University
of New York at Stony Brook; J.D. 1974, New York University. Excerpts from this Arti-
cle will appear in a forthcoming treatise by Daniel E. Lazaroff and Lionel S. Sobel, enti-
tled The Law of Professional & Amateur Sports, to be published by Clark Boardman Co.,
Ltd.
1. Berkow, Pro Football's Labor Scene, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1982, § 1, at 19, col. 6
(quoting Commissioner Rozelle's congressional testimony).
2. The closely held nature of most professional sports teams has enabled them to
avoid full public disclosure of their earnings. Nevertheless, there is a body of data that
underscores the fact that professional sports generate large revenues. Attendance figures
for Major League Baseball, The National Football League (NFL), the National Hockey
League (NHL) and the National Basketball Association (NBA) provide ample evidence
of the multi-million dollar character of the business of sports. In 1984, regular season
major league baseball games were attended by 44,739,157 fans. Office of the Commis-
sioner, Major League Baseball, Press Release (Nov. 23, 1984) (available in files of Ford-
ham Law Review). The 12 National League teams drew 20,778,000 paying customers,
while the 14 American League teams saw 23,961,157 fans pass through their turnstiles.
Id. The National Football League announced that its 28 teams drew 13,277,222 paying
customers in their 224 regular season games during 1983. National Football League,
Press Release No. NFL-5 (Mar. 19, 1984) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
Including pre-season exhibitions and post-season games, the NFL's 1983 paid attendance
was 16,817,070. Id. The 23 National Basketball Association teams enjoyed paid attend-
ance of 10,014,543 for the 1983-84 regular season, National Basketball Ass'n, 1983-84
Attendance (available in files of Fordham Law Review), and the National Hockey
League's 21 franchises drew 11,359,386 paying customers during the 1983-84 season, Na-
tional Hockey League, NHL Attendance (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
Although ticket prices vary from sport to sport, as well as among teams within a given
sport, it is apparent that the foregoing attendance figures translate into gross receipts
totaling many millions of dollars. Further, professional sports teams can expect to earn
substantial additional sums from parking, concessions and, of course, television and ra-
dio. For example, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 379 (1984), the Ninth Circuit
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
often engender a considerable amount of antitrust scrutiny, particularly
when ostensible competitors-the teams-openly cooperate and collec-
tively reach agreement as a league with respect to a variety of economic
issues. Thus, it is not at all surprising that with the exception of a long-
standing and rather anomalous judicially created antitrust exemption for
baseball,3 many professional and even some amateur sports have been the
subject of extensive antitrust litigation. More specifically, the federal an-
titrust laws have been deemed applicable to professional football,4 bas-
ketball,5 golf,6 hockey,7 horse racing,8 boxing,9 tennis' ° and bowling,"1 as
well as to various amateur athletic activities.' 2 This proliferation of case
Court of Appeals noted that the NFL would receive "approximately $2 billion" from the
television networks for the right to televise league games between 1982 and 1986. Id. at
1393. Even the relatively new United States Football League has negotiated a multi-
million dollar package for the telecasting of its games. See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1984, § 6
(Magazine), at 19, col. 3.
3. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972); Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953); Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259
U.S. 200, 209 (1922). In Flood, Justice Blackmun explained that baseball's antitrust ex-
emption is an established aberration supported by the doctrine of stare decisis. 407 U.S.
at 282. The rationale for the baseball exemption and questions regarding its continued
viability are beyond the scope of this Article. For recent commentary with respect to
professional baseball, see Allen, Lawyers, Law and Baseball, 64 A.B.A. J. 1530 (1978);
Martin, The Labor Controversy in Professional Baseball: the Flood Case, 23 Lab. L.J.
567 (1972); Rogers, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes: The Example of Baseball and
the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. Rev. 611 (1977); Shapiro, Monopsony Means Never Hav-
ing to Say You're Sorry-A Look at Baseball's Minor Leagues, 4 J. Contemp. L. 191
(1978); Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: The Limits of Stare Decisis, 12 B.C. Indus.
& Com. L. Rev. 737 (1971); Note, Flood in the Land of Antitrust: Another Look at
Professional Athletics, the Antitrust Laws and the Labor Law Exemption, 7 Ind. L. Rev.
541 (1974); Note, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to Baseball, 2 Mem. St. U.L. Rev.
299 (1972); Note, Curt Flood at Bat Against Baseball's "Reserve Clause," 8 San Diego L.
Rev. 92 (1971); Note, Baseball's Antitrust Exemption and the Reserve System: Reap-
praisal of an Anachronism, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 859 (1971); Comment, Antitrust
Law-Baseball Reserve System, 48 Notre Dame Law. 460 (1972); 1971 U. Tol. L. Rev.
594.
4. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957).
5. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1060 (C.D.
Cal. 1971).
6. See Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1263 (N.D. Ga.
1973).
7. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
8 See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 787-90
(7th Cir. 1981).
9. See United States v. International Boxing Club, Inc. 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955).
10. See Heldman v. United States Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F. Supp. 1241, 1250
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
11. See Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d
371, 376-77 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966).
12. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948
(1984) (men's collegiate athletics); Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,007, at 68,433 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (women's collegiate athletics); Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1147-54 (5th Cir. 1977) (collegiate athletics); Amateur Softball
Ass'n v. United States, 467 F.2d 312, 315-16 (10th Cir. 1972) (softball); Justice v. Na-
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law has, in turn, provided fertile ground for the rapid development of an
impressive collection of modern scholarly commentary with respect to
the relationship between the antitrust laws and the business of sports.13
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 375-84 (D. Ariz. 1983) (collegiate
football); Erie Buffalo Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n, 438 F. Supp. 310, 313
(W.D.N.Y. 1977) (hockey); College Athletic Placement Serv. Inc. v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,117, at 65,266 (D.N.J.) (collegiate athletics),
aff'd without published opinion, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974). See generally Weistart,
Antitrust Issues in the Regulation of College Sports, 5 J. C. & U. L. 77 (1977) (effect of
antitrust laws on collegiate athletics); Note, National Collegiate Athletic Association's Cer-
tification Requirement: A Section 1 Violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 Val. U.L.
Rev. 193 (1974) (same); Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis,
87 Yale L.J. 655 (1978) (same); 7 Cum. L. Rev. 505 (1977) (same).
13. See, eg., J. Weistart & C. Lowell, The Law of Sports, 477-766 (1979); Allison,
Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws; Status of the Reserve System, 25 Baylor L
Rev. 1 (1973); Blecher & Daniels, Professional Sports and the "Single Entity" Defense
Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 4 Whittier L. Rev. 217 (1982); Glick, Professional
Sports Franchise Movements and the Sherman Act. When and Where Teams Should Be
Able to Move, 23 Santa Clara L. Rev. 55 (1983); Goldstein, Out of Bounds Under the
Sherman Act? Player Restraints in Professional Team Sports, 4 Pepperdine L. Rev. 285
(1977); Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under
Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 Mich. L
Rev. 1 (1983); Jacobs & Winter, Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Ath-
letes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 Yale L.J. 1 (1971); Jones & Davies, Not Even
Semitough. Professional Sport and Canadian Antitrust, 23 Antitrust Bull. 713 (1978);
Kempf, The Misapplication of Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Leagues, 32 De Paul L
Rev. 625 (1983); Kurlantzick, Thoughts on Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws:
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 15 Conn. L
Rev. 183 (1983); Leavell & Millard, Trade Regulation and Professional Sports, 26 Mercer
L. Rev. 603 (1975); Roberts & Powers, Defining the Relationship Between Antitrust Law
and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 395 (1978); Simon, The First Great Leap: Some Reflections on the Spencer
Haywood Case, 48 L.A. B. Bull. 149 (1973); Sobel, The Emancipation of Professional
Athletes, 3 W. St. U.L. Rev. 185 (1976); Weistart, Player Discipline in Professional Sports:
The Antitrust Issues, 18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 703 (1977); Note, Antitrust and Profes-
sional Sport" Does Anyone Play By the Rules of the Game?, 22 Cath. U.L. Rev. 403
(1973); Note, The Sherman Act and Professional Team Sports: The NFL Rozelle Rule
Invalid Under the Rule of Reason, 9 Conn. L. Rev. 336 (1977); Note, The Super Bowl and
the Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 418,
429-30 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Super Bowl]; Note, The Eighth Circuit Suggests a La-
bor Exemption from Antitrust Laws for Collectively Bargained Labor Agreements in Pro-
fessional Sports, 21 St. Louis U.L.J. 565 (1977); Note, Antitrust-Professional Football-
The Rozelle Rule as an Unreasonable Restraint of Trade, 26 U. Kan. L. Rev. 121 (1977);
Comment, National Football League Restrictions on Competitive Bidding for Players'
Services, 24 Buffalo L. Rev. 613 (1975); Comment, The Sherman Act: Football Player
Controls-Are They Reasonable?, 6 Cal. W.L. Rev. 133 (1969); Comment, Application of
Antitrust Laws to Professional Sports' Eligibility and Draft Rules, 46 Mo. L. Rev. 797
(1981); Comment, The National Hockey League's Faceoff with Antitrust: McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 42 Ohio St. L.J. 603 (1981); Comment, Herschel Walker v. Na-
tional Football League: A Hypothetical Lawsuit Challenging the Propriety of the National
Football League's Four-or-Five Year Rule Under the Sherman Act, 9 Pepperdine L. Rev.
603 (1982); Comment, Antitrust Law: Procedural Safeguard Requirements in Concerted
Refusals to Deal. An Application to Professional Sports, 10 San Diego L. Rev. 413 (1973);
Comment, Sport in Court: The Legality of Professional Football's System of Reserve and
Compensation, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 252 (1980); Comment, Antitrust: Preseason Football
Tickets and Tie-Ins, 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 495; Case Note, Tying Arrangements in the Sale
1984]
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The fundamental purpose of this Article is to focus on and assess criti-
cally, pursuant to prevailing and developing antitrust principles, one
practice that is common to all major professional sports leagues: the
franchise relocation restriction. This type of restriction prohibits individ-
ual teams in a league from moving to a different home site without the
prior approval of a specified percentage of other league members. 4 The
relocation restraint may operate to prevent a transfer to a previously un-
represented city or to encumber a move to a location already occupied by
a league member. It is primarily the latter sort of restriction with which
this Article is concerned, because it is apparent that prevention of reloca-
tion under those circumstances eliminates the potential for significant di-
rect economic competition between teams in the same league.
Although relocation restraints have been the subject of some recent
commentary, 15 they have not received nearly as much attention as other
restrictive practices in the business of sports, such as those relating to
player eligibility, discipline and movement.' 6 Further, it appears that
some of the existing scholarship errs in its antitrust analysis, and that the
remainder fails either to assess sufficiently the legal ramifications of relo-
cation restrictions or to propose a satisfactory solution to the problems
presented. 7 In light of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' recent deci-
sion in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
of Season Tickets, 47 Temp. L.Q. 761 (1974); 41 Alb. L. Rev. 154 (1977); 15 Duq. L. Rev,
747 (1977); 59 Marq. L. Rev. 632 (1976).
14. See, e.g., National Basketball Ass'n Const. § 9(a) (Majority vote required for
franchise move after consideration of various objective factors. This provision just re-
cently replaced § 9 of the NBA Constitution that gave a league member the right to pre-
vent a transfer to its home territory.); National Football League, Constitution and By-
Laws § 4.3 (75% vote required before member can "transfer its franchise or playing site
to a different city, either within or outside its home territory"). The NFL only recently
established a procedure to consider certain criteria before a franchise can relocate, such
as past and projected revenues, stadium adequacy and the effect of relocation on other
league members. Janofsky, NFL. In New Policy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1984, § 5, at 1,
col 1; see also Kurlantzick, supra note 13, at 184 n.4 (discussing NHL and NBA reloca-
tion rules).
15. See, e.g., Glick, supra note 13; Kurlantzick, supra note 13, at 196-206; see also
Blecher & Daniels, supra note 13, at 218-32 (discussing "single entity" defense to reloca-
tion restraints); Grauer, supra note 13 (same); Kempf, supra note 13 (evaluating applica-
tion of antitrust laws to professional sports in general).
16. See supra note 13 and authorities cited therein.
17. For a critical analysis of some recent commentary, see infra notes 87-96, 175-87
and accompanying text. For a proposed statutory solution to the antitrust issues created
by relocation restraints, see infra notes 380-95 and accompanying text. It should also be
noted that all existing commentary preceded the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984), as well as two highly relevant June 1984 decisions by
the United States Supreme Court: National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Re-
gents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984) (holding restrictive collegiate football television plan viola-
tive of § 1) and Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984)
(holding corporation and wholly owned subsidiary constitute a single entity to which § 1
is inapplicable).
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League,'I concluding that a relocation restriction violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 9 and in view of the fact that this issue continues to surface
in professional sports,"0 further discussion of the antitrust issues raised
by such restraints is warranted.
There is another rationale for engaging in careful antitrust analysis of
the relocation restraint. The antitrust implications of relocation restric-
tions are of central importance to practitioners, students and teachers
who are or will be intimately involved in the legal aspects of sports orga-
nizations. Moreover, the results reached in relocation decisions may well
be of broader significance because the courts must necessarily grapple
with questions that have great relevance to all commercial and industrial
endeavors that encounter antitrust problems. This Article will therefore
utilize franchise relocation restraint litigation to facilitate a discussion of
several issues of more general importance.
The Article will begin by exploring the parameters of the intracorpo-
rate conspiracy doctrine, because sports teams frequently assert that they
are a single league unit for antitrust purposes and not individual competi-
tors engaged in concerted action. If a court were to accept the teams'
view, the implications for other businesses might well be profound. The
Article will then proceed to a discussion of the substantive antitrust ques-
tions raised by the relocation restraint. In so doing, it will be necessary to
discuss the relative propriety of per se rules or rule of reason analysis in
deciding certain antitrust cases. Discussion of the rule of reason will in-
volve relevant product and geographic market analysis and an evaluation
of the rule of reason itself, with particular emphasis on whether the rule
lacks sufficient resilience to deal correctly with some of the problems
presented in both sports and other types of antitrust cases. This analyti-
cal exercise will provide guidance in reaching conclusions in other busi-
ness contexts in which competitors seek to collaborate in some fashion
and still avoid antitrust liability. Finally, because it seems unlikely that
major sports leagues will be able to impose any relocation restraints that
can withstand attack under any existing antitrust standard, this Article
will suggest a legislative solution to the conundrum presented by the
sports cases. In sum, the primary purposes of this Article are to inform
the reader with respect to the antitrust implications of the franchise relo-
cation restraint and to argue that it is an unlawful practice. In so doing,
18. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
19. See id. at 1397-98. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1(1982).
20. The threatened relocation of the NFL's Philadelphia Eagles to Phoenix and the
recent moves of the NFL's Baltimore Colts to Indianapolis and the NBA's San Diego
Clippers to Los Angeles without league approval have kept franchise relocation issues in
the news. In fact, the NBA has sued the Clippers for S25 million for moving without
permission. L.A. Times, June 16, 1984, § III, at 1, col. 1. The NBA has taken the posi-
tion that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Los Angeles Coliseum does not preclude its re-
strictions on team movement. Id.
1984]
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the Article seeks also to demonstrate the broader importance of the
sports cases in the general development and growth of antitrust law.
I. THE SINGLE ENTITY DEFENSE
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is quite explicit that concerted action is a
prerequisite to a finding of a violation: "Every contract, combination
• ..or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."', Even though
the statute's admonition that every concerted trade restraint is illegal has
been judicially modified by the creation of a rule of reason,22 the statu-
tory requirement of collective conduct has remained a fundamental
threshold burden for any antitrust plaintiff. In fact, unilateral conduct,
no matter how anticompetitive, simply cannot be deemed a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act,2 3 although it may result in a violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act,2 4 or section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). One commentator has noted:
When courts talk about concerted action among competitors they are talking in
terms of conduct. . . .The statute, classically conceived, aims at bad conduct,
at conspirators who deliberately decide on evil, who eschew competition, who
plan and execute action to stifle market forces and who, conscious of their own
wrongdoing, take precaution to hide their conduct or disguise it.
Other things are notable about this vision in addition to its conduct orienta-
tion. . . . [I]t presents a single concept about common action, not three sepa-
rate ones: "contract . . .combination or conspiracy" becomes an alliterative
compound noun, roughly translated to mean "concerted action." There is little
need to grapple with issues about the meanings of the particular words of the
statute nor to mark nice distinctions among them.
L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust § 109, at 311-12 (1977).
22. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). For a discussion of the history and
development of the rule of reason and its applicability to trade restraints in professional
sports, see infra notes 300-79 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740
(1984); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1469 (1984); Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968); Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,
307 (1919); Modem Home Inst., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 513 F.2d 102,
108 (2d Cir. 1975); Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 878 (1st
Cir. 1966); Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,668, at
77,782-83 (E.D. Mich. 1978), affid in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 665 F.2d 74
(6th Cir. 1981); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 499, 531
(E.D. Mich. 1974), affid, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); see
also Desgranges Psychiatric Center, P.C. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 124 Mich. App.
237, 244-45, 333 N.W.2d 562, 565 (1983) (unilateral refusal to deal cannot violate state
antitrust statute requiring concerted action).
24. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), provides, in relevant part,
that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony." Because § 2 prohibits attempts to monopolize and the act of monopolization, as
well as combinations and conspiracies to monopolize, it reaches unilateral as well as con-
certed conduct. For a discussion of the possible applicability of § 2 to franchise reloca-
tion restraints, see infra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
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mission Act.2"
The relevance of the concerted action requirement of section 1 to liti-
gation involving the validity of franchise relocation restraints may be
simply stated. If, as some sports leagues have contended, a league should
be treated for purposes of antitrust analysis as a single economic unit, a
franchise relocation restriction agreed to by all league members could
never violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Although the relocation re-
straint might create a significant anticompetitive impact, or might even
reflect horizontal business activity that could be labeled per se illegal if
the individual teams were deemed separate and distinct business competi-
tors, a decision to treat the National Football League (NFL), National
Basketball Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL) or any
other sports organization as a single entity would preclude finding the
concerted conduct essential to any section 1 wrongdoing. In essence, the
relocation restriction would then be nothing more than a mechanism for
unilaterally determining where a product-the league sport-would be
marketed. It is therefore not at all unusual to find that sports league de-
fendants have repeatedly attempted to persuade courts that the sui
generis nature of professional sports organizations requires that they be
treated as single entities when their trade practices are challenged pursu-
ant to section 1.26
A. Application of Copperweld to Sports Leagues
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed this issue
in the context of sports leagues, it has had numerous opportunities to
comment on defendants' claims that affiliated enterprises should be
treated as a single entity for purposes of section 1. Just recently, in Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,27 the Court made a dramatic
departure from its earlier decisions dealing with intracorporate or intra-
enterprise conspiracy. Prior to Copperweld, Supreme Court precedent
had developed over four decades indicating that a parent company and
its subsidiaries, or two subsidiaries of the same parent, could be deemed
separate entities capable of concerted action.28 Copperweld, however, per-
25. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982),
declares unlawful "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce." It does
not require concerted conduct and the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly indi-
cated that the FTC may proceed pursuant to § 5 in order to reach conduct that might not
violate either the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). See, e.g.,
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384
U.S. 316, 321 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394
(1953).
26. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 48-86 and accompanying text. One
recent article argued strenuously for single entity treatment for teams participating in
league sports. See Grauer, supra note 13; see also Kempf, supra note 13, at 627-33 (eco-
nomic interdependence of league members requires single entity treatment). But see
Blecher & Daniels, supra note 13 (arguing against single entity defense).
27. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
28. See, eg., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 117 (1975);
1984]
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haps in response to a substantial body of critical scholarly commentary, 29
repudiated earlier case law and deemed a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary legally incapable of conspiracy for antitrust purposes.30 It
thus provided a glimmer of hope to those who would advance a single
entity status for sports teams in a league setting. Nevertheless, careful
analysis of Copperweld suggests that it would not and should not be ex-
tended to immunize separately owned and operated sports teams from
section 1 coverage.
The Supreme Court carefully and narrowly framed the question in
Copperweld as "whether the coordinated acts of a parent and its wholly
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
29. See, e.g., M. Handler, Reforming the Antitrust Laws 5, 8, 12-13 (1982); Barndt,
Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 Mont. L. Rev. 158,
197 (1962); Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-First Annual Anti-
trust Review, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 182, 184-85 (1969); Handler, Twenty-Five Years of Anti-
trust, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 415, 452-53 (1973); Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust
Developments, 10 The Record 332, 342-44 (1955); Handler, Anti-trust: New Frontiers and
New Perplexities, 6 The Record 59, 79-80 (1951); Handler, Some Misadventures in Anti-
trust Policymaking-Nineteenth Annual Review, 76 Yale L.J. 92, 119-22 (1966); Handler
& Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 Cardozo L. Rev.
23, 25-26 (1981); Kempf, Bathtub Conspiracies: Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent
Brew?, 24 Bus. Law. 173, 181 (1968); McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises,
and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 Va. L. Rev. 183, 184-88 (1955); Rahl, Conspiracy
and the Antitrust Laws, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 743, 767-68 (1950); Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Con-
spiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5, 26-27 (1963); Willis & Pitof-
sky, Antitrust Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 20, 24-35
(1968); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Sug-
gested Standard, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 717 (1977); Note, "Conspiring Entities" Under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 661 (1982); Comment, All in the Family: When
Will Internal Discussions Be Labeled Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy?, 14 Duq. L. Rev. 63
(1975); Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 Yale L.J. 372
(1954).
30. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2742-45 (1984).
In Copperweld, Lear Siegler, Inc. (Lear) had agreed not to compete with Regal Tube Co.
(Regal), a wholly-owned subsidiary of petitioner Copperweld Corp. (Copperweld)
purchased by Copperweld from Lear. Id. at 2732. When a Lear officer formed a com-
pany to compete with Regal, Copperweld threatened a supplier with legal action if it
dealt with the competitor in what Copperweld perceived to be violation of the noncompe-
tition covenant agreed to by Lear. Id. at 2732-33. The supplier ceased selling to the com-
petitor, who then brought suit alleging a § I violation by Copperweld, Regal and the
supplier. Id. The jury exonerated the supplier from any conspiratorial activity, but found
that Copperweld and Regal had unlawfully conspired in violation of § I of the Sherman
Act. Id. at 2735. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of liability, even
though the sole conspirators were a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary.
Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 316-20 (7th Cir. 1982)
(citing Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 917 (1980)), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984). The Supreme Court thereupon granted
certiorari to re-examine the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, and ultimately reversed
the decision of the court below by a five-to-three vote. See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at
2736. Justice White did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at
2745.
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owned subsidiary can, in the legal sense contemplated by § 1 of the Sher-
man Act, constitute a combination or conspiracy."3 Indeed, in reaching
the conclusion that these entities could not conspire for antitrust pur-
poses, 2 the Court's holding was expressly limited to a parent and a
wholly owned subsidiary.33 Chief Justice Burger was very careful to em-
phasize that the Court was not considering at all the circumstances, "if
any, [under which] a parent may be liable for conspiring with an affili-
ated corporation it does not completely own."34 Therefore, Copperweld
31. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. CL 2731, 2736 (1984).
32. Id. at 2745.
33. Id. at 2740.
34. Id. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, argued that "in all but perhaps
one" earlier case, reliance on a theory of conspiracy between affiliated corporations was
unnecessary to the result. Id. at 2736. But see id. at 2746-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(majority opinion inconsistent with at least seven previous Supreme Court decisions). For
a collection of the earlier cases, see supra note 28. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
332 U.S. 218 (1947), the Justice Department alleged that certain defendants had com-
bined to restrain and monopolize trade in the sale of motor vehicles for use as taxicabs in
several cities, and to restrain and monopolize trade in the business of furnishing cab
services for hire in the Chicago area. Id. at 224. The defendants were one Markin, the
president, general manager and controlling shareholder of Checker Cab Manufacturing
Corporation, and five affiliated companies (controlled by Markin) that operated a sub-
stantial share of licensed cabs in several cities. Id. at 220-22. The government charged
that Markin had illegally combined with the affiliated cab companies and with Checker
by requiring the affiliated companies to purchase taxi cabs exclusively from Checker,
thereby foreclosing sales by other manufacturers. Id. at 224. Even though Markin as-
serted that the alleged antitrust violation was merely a form of lawful vertical integration,
the Supreme Court disagreed and expressly found that the facts alleged supported a find-
ing of concerted action by separate actors. Id. at 227. In Copperweld, however, the ma-
jority chose to distinguish and to minimize the effect of Yellow Cab by asserting that "the
affiliation of the defendants was irrelevant because the original acquisitions [of the affili-
ates] were themselves illegal." Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2737 (emphasis in original); see
also Handler & Smart, supra note 29, at 29 (subsidiaries in Yellow Cab had not been
formed to carry out parent's business but were corporations of "prior disparate owner-
ship that were combined to effect a restraint of trade").
Similarly, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951), the Supreme Court apparently took a rather dim view of the single entity defense.
In Kiefer-Stewart, the defendants were a liquor manufacturer and its two wholly-owned
subsidiaries that distributed the liquor to wholesalers. It was alleged that the subsidiaries
had jointly and illegally refused to sell to a wholesaler who declined to abide by maxi-
mum resale prices imposed by the subsidiaries. The Supreme Court found that despite
defendants' claim that they were " 'mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-mer-
chandizing unit,'" id. at 215, the affiliated companies were capable of conspiring with
each other for § 1 purposes, id. at 214. Justice Black reasoned that the defendants' ten-
dered defense "runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and control
does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws. . . . The rule is
especially applicable where, as here, respondents hold themselves out as competitors."
Id. at 215. Despite this rather blunt and straightforward language, the Copperweld Court
suggested that "the Kiefer-Stewart Court failed to confront the anomalies an intra-enter-
prise doctrine entails" and that "were the cases decided today, the same result probably
could be justified on the ground that the subsidiaries conspired with wholesalers other
than the plaintiff." Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2738 & n.9 (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145, 149-150 & n.6 (1968) and United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,
45-46 (1960)).
After Kiefer-Stewart, in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
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provides little or no guidance on the issue of single entity treatment for
sports teams enjoying no common ownership. Indeed, if any inference
(1951), the Court was faced with claims that commonly owned but separately incorpo-
rated defendants had combined in restraint of trade. More specifically, it was alleged that
an American company, together with its British and French subsidiaries, jointly owned
with others, had agreed to fix prices, allocate territories and protect each other's markets.
Id. at 596. The Court reiterated that "[tihe fact that there is common ownership or
control of the contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact of the
antitrust laws." Id. at 598. Yet, in Copperweld, Chief Justice Burger once again con-
cluded that the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine "was in no way necessary to the re-
sult" because of the lack of a true parent-subsidiary relationship and the presence of
illegal stock acquisitions. Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2739; see also Handler & Smart,
supra note 29, at 31-33 (discussing Court's application of intracorporate conspiracy doc-
trine).
More recently, in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134,
141-42 (1968), the Supreme Court repudiated a single entity claim and again gave a broad
reading to the concerted action requirement of § 1 by applying it to affiliated enterprises.
In Perma Life, the Court reversed decisions below that had permitted defendants to shel-
ter themselves from antitrust liability by claiming that they were a single business entity.
See Perma Life, 376 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 134 (1968). Several
franchised dealers of Midas, Inc. alleged that Midas had combined with its parent, other
subsidiaries of the parent and six individuals who were corporate agents or officers.
Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 135. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants had combined through
franchise agreements to ban plaintiffs from purchasing supplies from others and from
selling outside designated territories. Id. at 136-37. In addition, it was alleged that the
agreements tied muffler sales to sales of other Midas products and fixed retail prices. Id.
The Court, speaking through Justice Black, tersely rejected the single entity argument by
noting that "since. . . Midas and [its parent] availed themselves of the privilege of doing
business through separate corporations, the fact of common ownership could not save
them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities." Id. at 141-
42. Despite this apparently unequivocal endorsement of the intra-corporate conspiracy
doctrine in Perma Life, the Copperweld Court dismissed the broad language of that case
by characterizing it as "at most only an alternative holding." Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at
2739.
Further, the Court in Copperweld did not even attempt to respond to language in the
recent case of United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 117 (1975), in
which the Supreme Court had given short shrift to a single entity argument. In Citizens,
the Court did ultimately conclude that a bank's de facto branching system and subse-
quent acquisition of such branches did not result in either Sherman or Clayton Act viola-
tions. Id. at 119-22. Nevertheless, Justice Stewart indicated that the earlier cases dealing
with intracorporate conspiracy remained good law and were controlling:
The central message of the Sherman Act is that a business entity must find new
customers and higher profits through internal expansion-that is, by competing
successfully rather than by arranging treaties with its competitors. This Court
has held that even commonly owned firms must compete against each other, if
they hold themselves out as distinct entities. . . . A fortiori, independently
owned firms cannot escape competing merely by pretending to common owner-
ship or control, for the pretense would simply perfect the cartel. We may also
assume, though the question is a new one, that a business entity generally can-
not justify restraining trade between itself and an independently owned entity
merely on the ground that it helped launch that entity, by providing expert
advice or seed capital.
Id. at 116-17 (citations omitted).
In sum, a more than colorable argument can be made that the Copperweld Court is
unfaithful to a long line of precedent and that it errs as a matter of sound antitrust policy.
See Copperweld, 104 S. Ct. at 2745-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (lengthy argument for
separate entity treatment of even affiliated corporations).
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may be drawn from the majority opinion, it is that the Court would be
reluctant to extend its decision to preclude section 1 liability for wholly
unaffiliated business entities.
In the context of sports leagues, the relationships of teams to each
other and to the league itself simply do not fit neatly into the parent/
wholly owned subsidiary paradigm. As some of the recent case law illus-
trates,35 teams are not only separately incorporated, but they are also
separately owned and do not share the single "corporate consciousness"
or "complete unity of interest" found by the Copperweld Court. 36 In-
deed, teams often display markedly different attitudes with respect to a
number of business issues, including salaries, ticket prices and athletic
strategies. Although there is a very real degree of interdependence and a
need for some cooperation, 37 sports teams fall far short of the common
control and total unity of interest exhibited by a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiary. It would therefore appear that sports leagues may not
qualify for single entity treatment.
This conclusion is further supported by Chief Justice Burger's attempt
in Copperweld to distinguish between unilateral action on the one hand
and concerted activity on the other.3" The Chief Justice made the point
that even unreasonable unilateral conduct will be treated unfavorably
under existing antitrust law only when it poses a danger of monopoliza-
tion.39 This is because it is often difficult, in examining a single entity, to
distinguish healthy competition from anticompetitive behavior.' In con-
trast, "[c]oncerted activity . . . is judged more sternly than unilateral
activity."41 Unlike unilateral conduct, collective behavior may be at-
tacked even if it does not threaten monopolization." The rationale for
this substantial distinction in the law is simply that "[c]oncerted activity
inherently is fraught with anticompetitive risk [because] [i]t deprives the
marketplace of the independent centers of decisionmaking that competi-
tion assumes and demands. 4 3
It can be inferred from this analysis by the Copperweld Court that sin-
gle entity status for sports leagues would immunize them from section 1
and insulate even unreasonably anticompetitive behavior unless it
threatened to effect a monopoly in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. There is no indication that the Court intended to widen this con-
ceded gap in antitrust law between sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Rather, Copperweld reflects a narrow ruling that is limited to parent/
wholly owned subsidiary relationships. Even if it is a decision upon
35. See infra notes 49-86 and accompanying text.
36. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2742 (1984).
37. See infra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
38. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740-45 (1984).
39. Id. at 2740.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2741.
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which courts may build and that courts might extend to partly owned
subsidiaries," there is not even a shred of dicta in Copperweld suggesting
that separately owned and operated sports teams should be protected by
its holding. Further, in view of the gap between sections 1 and 2, sound
public policy militates against statutory interpretations that effectively
insulate even unreasonable behavior from judicial scrutiny.
It is true that even before Copperweld, while some federal circuit
courts of appeals zealously applied the prior Supreme Court precedents
and held as a matter of law that separate incorporation established a plu-
rality of actors,45 other lower federal courts struggled mightily to avoid a
rigid application of these earlier cases.46 Yet, neither this line of cases nor
critical commentary went so far as to suggest that firms that lack any
common ownership or control (such as individually owned sports teams)
should be protected by an alteration of the prevailing doctrine.47 In fact,
the single entity defense has been the subject of litigation in the context of
professional sports and there is an evolving body of precedent rejecting
the claim. Although earlier cases had hinted at the possibility that pro-
fessional sports leagues might seek protection from section 1 by claiming
single entity status,48 recent decisions have properly reached an opposite
44. Courts are already extending Copperweld beyond the parent/wholly owned sub-
sidiary situation. See, e.g., Hood v. Tenneco Tex. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th
Cir. 1984) (two wholly owned subsidiaries of common parent cannot conspire under § 1);
Magnum Force Distribs. v. Bon Bon Co., No. 84-2629, Bench Order at 13-14 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 1984) (60% subsidiary cannot conspire with parent).
45. See, e.g., Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579
F.2d 20, 33 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); H & B Equip. Co. v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1978); Cromar Co. v. Nuclear
Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 511-12 (3d Cir. 1976); George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1004 (1975); Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39, 44 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
46. Prior to Copperweld, some circuits refused to rely solely on separate incorporation
as dispositive and instead indicated that all the surrounding relevant facts and circum-
stances had to be analyzed. See, e.g., William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continen-
tal Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1054-55 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982);
Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 587-90 (8th Cir. 1981); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v.
Summa Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617-19 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.denied, 447 U.S. 906 (1980);
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726-27 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 917 (1980); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 801-03 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977). Handler and Smart have discussed these authorities in
some detail and have also set forth additional categories of cases that militate against the
rigid, literal application of the pre-Copperweld case law: (1) cases involving a sole deci-
sionmaker in which one person controls the related entities and makes the business deci-
sions; (2) cases involving concerted action restraining no outsider's trade; and (3) cases
dealing with corporations not held out as competitors. See Handler & Smart, supra note
29, at 46-55.
47. See authorities cited supra notes 29, 46. See also Blecher & Daniels, supra note 13,
at 232-38 (necessity of cooperation among sports league members does not preclude sepa-
rate entity status). But see R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 278-79 (1978) (favoring sin-
gle entity status for sports teams and leagues); J. Weistart & C. Lowell, supra note 13, at
698-702 (same); Grauer, supra note 13, at 2-6 (same).
48. See, e.g., Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D.N.Y.
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conclusion.4 9
B. Analyzing the Argument for Single Entity Treatment
The National Football League argued strenuously for single entity
treatment in its recent unsuccessful appeal in Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum Commission v. National Football League,5" and its arguments there
were typical of the issues raised in the other professional sports cases. In
directing a verdict for plaintiff on this issue in the trial court, Judge
Pregerson took the opportunity to review the nature of the relationship
among NFL teams and their relationship with the league itself. He ex-
plained that "[o]n its face, the NFL certainly appears to be an an associa-
tion of separate business entities rather than one single enterprise," as
each club is a separate legal entity with separate ownership.5 Although
members share a large portion of their revenues, profits and losses are not
shared. 2 Furthermore, Judge Pregerson noted that each team is "man-
aged independently, each making its own decisions concerning ticket
prices, player acquisitions and salaries, the hiring of coaches and admin-
istrators, and the terms of their stadium leases. They do not exchange or
share their accounting books and records." 53
1974); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 969-70
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
49. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League,
726 F.2d 1381, 1387-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984); North American
Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-58 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). Other sports cases have implicitly concluded that the single
entity defense is not applicable to sports leagues. See, eg., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,
593 F.2d 1173, 1177 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. National Football League, 543
F.2d 606, 616 & n.19 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Boris v. United
States Football League, 1984-I Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,012, at 68,462 (C.D. Cal. 1984);
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn. 1977); Robertson
v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 892-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. Na-
tional Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 79-82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), affid and cross appeal
dismissed as moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Phila-
delphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462,
503-04 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
50. See Opening Brief of NFL Appellants at 10-19, 28-44, Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (available
in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as NFL Briefn.
51. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 519 F.
Supp. 581, 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
397 (1984). The district court commented that "[t]he Supreme Court has consistently
rejected the single-entity argument in circumstances more favorable to that argument
than those presented in this case." Id. (citations omitted). The opinion then noted that
even firms with a high degree of common ownership were deemed separate actors for § 1
purposes, and cited several pre-Copperweld Supreme Court cases as support. Id. The
Supreme Court's recent repudiation of those decisions in Copperweld should not alter the
result in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum because there is a complete lack of common
ownership in the case of NFL teams. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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At an earlier stage of the same litigation,54 Judge Pregerson purported
to distinguish both San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey
League" and Levin v. National Basketball Association 56-the two earlier
cases that had flirted with single entity treatment for sports leagues. In
San Francisco Seals, the owners of a professional hockey team asserted
that the NHL and its member clubs had violated the Sherman Act by
preventing plaintiff from moving to Vancouver, British Columbia." In
rejecting the claim the court stated that hockey teams are "not competi-
tors in the economic sense. . . . They are, in fact, all members of a single
unit competing as such with other similar professional leagues." 5' 8 Simi-
larly, in Levin, where a businessman was denied permission to purchase
an NBA team, the court, in rejecting the antitrust claim, alluded to the
Seals case and asserted that plaintiff was seeking "co-partnership" with
other NBA owners.5 9 Nevertheless, Judge Pregerson in Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum expressly eschewed any reliance on those cases and
tersely dismissed them as cases that "merely held that the actions com-
plained of did not have any anticompetitive effect."'
Although the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum trial court's reading of
these decisions may be criticized as unduly narrow, it is certainly true
that in neither case was the problem of franchise relocation to another
league member's home city presented. Thus, there is a much stronger
argument for a finding of an absence of anticompetitive impact in Levin
and San Francisco Seals than in a case such as Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum, in which the relocation restriction prevented intra-league com-
petition.61 Yet, for section 1 purposes, the presence or absence of an-
ticompetitive purpose and/or effect is utterly irrelevant if no concerted
action exists. Perhaps a better approach would be to recognize that
although these cases do provide some support for the single entity de-
fense, they were incorrectly decided. Certainly, professional sports
leagues cannot be viewed as true partnerships in any real sense. Perhaps
54. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468
F. Supp. 154, 164 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 397 (1984).
55. 379 F. Supp. 966 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
56. 385 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
57. San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. National Hockey League, 379 F. Supp. 966, 967
(C.D. Cal. 1974).
58. Id. at 970.
59. Levin v. National Basketball Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 149, 152 & n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
60. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F.
Supp. 154, 164 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aft'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 397 (1984).
61. Of course, one could still argue that even if no issue of intra-league competition
were presented in Levin or San Francisco Seals, the challenged conduct might nonetheless
have caused other anticompetitive effects. For example, stadium owners' ability to com-
pete nationally for major sports franchises might be inhibited by denial of permission to
move a team. Also, it seems that concerted refusal to sell a team, or to permit such a sale,
restrains the ability of sports entrepreneurs to enter the market.
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the most generous characterization of their activities may be that they
are somewhat unconventional joint ventures,62 and even this may be an
exaggeration of that term. 63 Yet even if the joint venture label is applica-
ble, it provides no blanket protection from antitrust scrutiny under sec-
tion 1. Rather, determination of the appropriate antitrust standard-per
se illegality or rule of reason analysis-may be influenced by the exist-
ence of a joint venture, the asserted need for cooperation among allegedly
independent teams and all other factors that might militate in favor of
mutual cooperation."
On appeal in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum the Ninth Circuit, over a
vigorous dissent by one judge,65 affirmed the district court's holding that
the NFL and its teams were not one actor for antitrust purposes. 6 Fo-
cusing upon the undisputed material facts regarding NFL organization
and the nature and extent of cooperation among its teams, Judge Ander-
son explained that a directed verdict for the plaintiff on the single entity
issue was appropriate. 67 The court noted that other cases had flatly re-
jected single entity claims by sports leagues.68 Although the Ninth Cir-
cuit acknowledged that it would characterize multiple corporations as a
single entity where a single individual or parent corporation set corporate
policy,69 it concluded that NFL clubs simply failed to fit within this "ex-
ception":70 "While the NFL clubs have certain common purposes, they
do not operate as a single entity. NFL policies are not set by one individ-
ual or parent corporation, but by the separate teams acting jointly."7"
Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that NFL teams are indeed "an asso-
ciation of teams sufficiently independent and competitive with one an-
62. The joint venture label is the characterization given by the NFL itself to its teams'
conduct. See NFL Brief, supra note 50, at 10.
63. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468
F. Supp. 154, 162 n.9 (C.D. Cal. 1979) ("Strictly speaking, the NFL teams are not en-
gaged in a joint venture" because they do not share risks as well as profits.), aff'd, 726
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984). For other definitions of the joint
venture concept for antitrust purposes, see infra notes 249-59 and accompanying text.
64. As Chief Justice Burger explained in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740-41 (1984) (citations omitted):
Certain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are
thought so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry
into the harm it has actually caused .... Other combinations, such as mergers,
joint ventures, and various vertical agreements, hold the promise of increasing a
firm's efficiency and enabling it to compete more effectively. Accordingly, such
combinations are judged under a rule of reason, an inquiry into market power
and market structure designed to assess the combination's actual effect.
65. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726
F.2d 1381, 1401-10 (9th Cir.) (Williams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
66. Id. at 1387-90.
67. Id. at 1387.
68. Id. at 1388.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1388-89.
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other" to be deemed separate entities for section 1 purposes.7 2
Emphasizing the independent ownership of the clubs, the absence of
profit and loss sharing, and interteam competition for players, coaches
and management, as well as direct economic rivalry for fans, local televi-
sion and radio revenues, and media space where teams operate in close
proximity, the Ninth Circuit concluded that each team is a separate en-
tity for antitrust purposes.73
Similarly, in North American Soccer League v. National Football
League,74 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals also found that the NFL
was not a single entity." In that case, a professional soccer league suc-
cessfully challenged an NFL cross-ownership ban that precluded mem-
bers from owning teams in other professional sports leagues.76 The court
characterized the NFL as an "unincorporated joint venture consisting of
28 individually owned separate professional football teams."' 77 The court
acknowledged that the interdependence of teams engaged in league foot-
ball made an economic joint venture "essential. '78 The court also went
on to indicate, as did the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Memorial Coli-
seum, 79 that while teams do share certain television revenues and gate
receipts, each team is a "discrete legal entity," and expenses, capital ex-
penditures and profits are not shared.80 The court further recognized
that local radio and television revenue was not shared, 8' nor was revenue
derived from parking and concessions.8 2
In its rejection of the single entity argument, the circuit court in North
American Soccer League tersely rejected the assertion that by attaching a
joint venture label to NFL activities the bite of section 1 could be com-
pletely avoided: "The theory that a combination of actors can gain ex-
emption from § 1 of the Sherman Act by acting as a 'joint venture' has
repeatedly been rejected by the Supreme Court and the Sherman Act has
been held applicable to professional sports teams by numerous lesser fed-
eral courts."8 3 The court also explained that the district court's attempt
to distinguish earlier cases84 was unpersuasive because the cross-owner-
72. Id. at 1389.
73. Id. The Court of Appeals did conclude that the nature of league sports militated
in favor of a rule of reason analysis rather than a per se approach. Id. at 1389-90. See
infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
74. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
75. Id. at 1251-52.
76. Id. at 1250.
77. Id. at 1251.
78. Id.
79. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
80. North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249,
1251-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
81. Id. at 1252.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1257 (citations omitted).
84. See North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 505 F. Supp.
659, 671-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074
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ship ban did not merely protect the NFL as a league, but rather, also was
designed to shield NFL teams "as discrete economic entities from com-
petition in their respective home territories. ' 85 Thus, the Second Circuit
concluded that the single entity defense was intolerable in this case be-
cause "such a loophole would permit league members to escape antitrust
responsibility for any restraint entered into by them that would benefit
their league or enhance their ability to compete even though the benefit
would be outweighed by its anticompetitive effects." 6
It is true that some recent commentary argues strenuously that the
conclusions reached in the foregoing decisions are erroneous.87 In the
most detailed and exhaustive criticism of these cases, Professor Grauer
attempts to draw an analogy between the NFL and a law firm partner-
ship," and concludes that consumer wealth maximization should be the
sole antitrust goal and that this goal precludes the application of section
1 to the sports league cases.89 Although Grauer's efforts reflect perhaps
the most clearly articulated arguments for single entity status for sports
leagues,9" his reasons seem insufficient for providing section 1 immunity
to these sports organizations.
Even if Grauer correctly characterizes the restraints imposed by a
league on its members as the equivalent of a partner's covenant not to
compete, it must be recognized that such ancillary agreements are not
immune from antitrust scrutiny. Rather, they are subject to a rule of
reason analysis.9" Even if the league acts as a single entity, each agree-
ment between the league as an entity and individual teams may be
viewed, for antitrust purposes, as a "contract" between two parties. 92
Grauer's analogy to a law firm partnership breaks down when it is recog-
nized that generally such firms, unlike sports leagues, operate under com-
(1982). The district court had concluded that earlier cases involved competition between
individual teams regarding player relations or playing sites, whereas the cross-ownership
ban involved the NFL as a single league unit acting against another league.
85. North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249,
1257 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
86. Id. But see North American Soccer League v. National Football League, cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1074, 1078 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(analogizing sports league to partners working together in a law firm).
87. See Grauer, supra note 13, at 1-7; Kempf, supra note 13, at 633. But see Blecher
& Daniels, supra note 13, at 236-38 (supporting refusal to exempt sports leagues from § 1
of Sherman Act).
88. See Grauer, supra note 13, at 3-7.
89. See id. at 59.
90. The majority opinion in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984), character-
izes Grauer's arguments as "persuasive" but determines that his reasoning is not "so
compelling that existing precedent can be ignored or that we should grant this association
of 28 independent businesses blanket immunity from attack under § I of the Sherman
Act." Id. at 1390 n.4.
91. See Handler & Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 669, 750-55 (1982).
92. See id. (discussing covenants not to compete pursuant to a rule of reason
analysis).
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mon ownership and control. They may be departmentalized, but each
firm still enjoys the efficiency associated with partners sharing common
policies and practices and one set of administrative overhead costs.
Grauer argues that some firms include partners who are separately incor-
porated and that there may be an unequal allocation of profits and
losses,93 but it does not follow that this suggests single entity treatment
for sports leagues. On the contrary, these somewhat unorthodox altera-
tions of traditional partnership relationships, particularly separate incor-
poration without common control, may militate in favor of finding the
participating professional corporations to be separate actors for section 1
purposes. To the extent that law firms are structured in a manner that
approximates a joint venture between two or more separate corporate
entities, there appears to be no policy reason forbidding antitrust scrutiny
of their joint action.94
Certainly the most important aspect of Grauer's article is the recurrent
theme that intra-league restraints may be essential to the efficient con-
duct of the business of professional sports.95 Yet even if one were to
concede this point, it does not support the proposition that teams are
part of a single league entity. At best, this argument makes a strong case
for a rule of reason approach to such restraints rather than per se con-
demnation of them. If these trade restraints are in fact so procompetitive
and so conducive to efficient operation, why are-scholars, such as Grauer
so reluctant to have them subjected to rule of reason scrutiny? After all,
if these restraints, on balance, promote competition more than they hin-
der it, and contribute measurably to the realization of efficiencies, they
should survive a rule of reason test. There should be no need to foreclose
totally an inquiry into the justifications for and the dangers of a particu-
lar restraint.96
In sum, the world of professional sports does indeed present unique
and difficult problems for the antitrust observer. Courts and scholars
have struggled for years to reconcile the basic precepts of antitrust law
with the need for greater flexibility created by the sports cases.97 The sui
generis nature of professional sports organizations may well be relevant,
93. See Grauer, supra note 13, at 29-30.
94. This approach would most likely be only of academic significance. If modifica-
tion of traditional law firm partnerships resulted in the treatment of individual lawyers
and professional corporations as separate actors, it still would be highly improbable that
any antitrust problem would arise. One would be hard pressed to think of any law firm
with enough market power to have any serious anticompetitive effect on the marketplace
for legal services. In sharp contrast, major sports leagues wield significant market power.
See infra notes 325-53 and accompanying text.
95. See Grauer, supra note 13, at 59; see also Kempf, supra note 13, at 631-33 (dis-
cussing the economic need for joint action in professional sports leagues).
96. The propriety of not precluding substantive analysis of these restraints is best
emphasized by the fact that courts have concluded that sports league restraints have been
unreasonable and therefore unenforceable even under a rule of reason standard. See infra
notes 357-76 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
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or even determinative, in deciding the substantive antitrust issues raised
in franchise relocation and other sports cases. This uniqueness, however,
is not and should not be dispositive of the distinct and separate issue of
single entity characterization. Case law and public policy both militate
in favor of a conclusion that sports teams, as separately owned and in-
dependent legal entities, are capable of combining for section 1 purposes.
A contrary result would certainly be justified if teams were merely divi-
sions of a single corporation, and perhaps a different conclusion would
also be reached if such teams were commonly owned and controlled.
Neither scenario applies, however, and it is therefore appropriate to find
that a plurality of actors exists for section 1 purposes.
Any other conclusion would preclude all section 1 inquiry and would
engraft on the Sherman Act the type of implied exemption that should be
sparingly granted.98 Single entity status for sports organizations would
create a foundation of precedent, and other industries would then argue
that interdependence and the need for cooperation between firms pre-
clude any application of section 1 to their collective conduct. This poten-
tially massive avoidance of substantive consideration of trade restraints
on the merits does not seem wise as a matter of sound antitrust policy.
II. PER SE ILLEGALITY OR RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS FOR
RELOCATION RESTRICTIONS?
Once the single entity issue is resolved and it is established that profes-
sional sports teams are separate actors for section 1 purposes, a more
perplexing and complex set of issues is presented. Simply stated, the key
question is whether section 1 of the Sherman Act is violated by a
franchise relocation restriction. This rather straightforward question,
however, is not easily resolved. The antitrust analyst must respond to
this query by asking, for example, whether the individual teams, as mem-
bers of each league, should be characterized as economic competitors en-
gaged in a collective, horizontal restraint of trade. If so, should a rule of
per se illegality apply or should a rule of reason analysis be invoked
whether or not individual teams compete, and can the latter approach be
justified in light of prevailing doctrine? In sum, it is necessary to deter-
mine the extent to which the sui generis nature of professional sports can
be relied on in characterizing and analyzing the franchise relocation
restraint.
This section of the Article will attempt to demonstrate that although
plausible arguments for application of a per se rule can be made, a rule of
reason standard is preferable as a matter of policy, and that such an ap-
98. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (repeal of antitrust
law by implication is generally not favored); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369
U.S. 482, 485 (1962) ("Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied."); Geor-
gia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S.439, 456-57 (1945) (repeals of Sherman Act by
implication are not favored); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)
(same).
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proach is supported by emerging precedent. It will also be shown, how-
ever, that even pursuant to a rule of reason analysis, it is highly unlikely
that major sports leagues will be successful in defending their franchise
relocation restraints against antitrust attack.
A. The Nature of Professional Sports
It has already been observed that sports organizations and leagues defy
precise description in classic economic or legal nomenclature99 and are
therefore difficult to analyze and classify in an antitrust context. At the
risk of being somewhat redundant, however, the attributes of sports
leagues merit repetition and amplification as a means of underscoring the
nature of the analytical problems presented. Courts have recognized the
unique interdependent relationship of teams in a league and their need-
unlike ordinary competitive businesses-to regulate competition among
themselves in order to survive.
In a relatively early decision, United States v. National Football
League, 1 o the government challenged NFL bylaws restraining television
and radio broadcasting of NFL games. The bylaws prevented: (a) the
telecasting of outside games into home territories of other teams on days
when those other teams played at home; (b) the telecasting of outside
games into home territories when home teams were playing away from
home but telecasting into their home territories; and (c) the radio broad-
casting of outside games into home territories when home teams were
either playing at home or playing away from home and televising or
broadcasting those games.' 0 ' The court used a rule of reason analysis,
upholding the first restriction 10 2 and invalidating the other two.' 3 The
opinion, emphasizing the sui generis aspects of professional sports, noted
that whereas "[tihe ordinary business makes every effort to sell as much
of its product or services as it can. . . . [i]f all the teams should compete
as hard as they can in a business way, the stronger teams would be likely
to drive the weaker ones into financial failure," eventually causing the
entire league to fail.' °"
This characterization of sports leagues as a unique combination of in-
terdependent entities has been echoed in more recent case law and com-
mentary. For example, in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 0 5 even though the
99. See supra notes 50-86 and accompanying text.
100. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
101. Id. at 321.
102. Id. at 322-26.
103. Id. at 326-27. Subsequently, Congress expressly authorized NFL teams to coop-
erate with respect to joint telecasting of NFL games. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1982).
There have been cases construing these statutory provisions. See, e.g., Colorado High
School Activities Ass'n v. National Football League, 711 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1983);
WTWV, Inc. v. National Football League, 678 F.2d 142 (11th Cir. 1982).
104. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
105. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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court found that the NFL player draft ran afoul of the rule of reason,10 6
Judge McKinnon noted that NFL clubs are not only noncompetitive in
the economic sense, but that on the playing field as well, a competitive
balance is necessary to maintain spectator interest.'0 Similarly, in Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,1
0 8
the trial court noted that "in certain areas cooperation among the teams,
not competition, is required to produce an entertainment product."''
On appeal from a jury verdict adverse to the league, the court of appeals
also acknowledged the rather unique nature of league sports" and the
consequent difficulty of "analyzing the negative and positive effects of a
business practice in an industry which does not readily fit into the anti-
trust context." ''
Thus, it is common to find that courts are reluctant to apply per se
rules of illegality to antitrust cases involving sports organizations and
frequently opt instead for a rule of reason approach."12 Nevertheless, it
106. Id. at 1183-89.
107. Id. at 1179.
108. 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
109. Id. at 163; accord North American Soccer League v. National Football League,
670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982); Kapp v. National
Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 79 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd and cross appeal dismissed as
moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); see also J. Weistart
& C. Lowell, supra note 13, § 5.11, at 757-58 (discussing interdependence of league
members); Grauer, supra note 13, at 24 (potential harm of economic competition among
NFL teams); Kempf, supra note 13, at 628 (underlying economics of professional sports
leagues); Kurlantzick, supra note 13, at 189 (unique character of competing football
teams).
110. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
111. Id. at 1391.
112. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948,
2953 (1984); M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 1984-I Trade Cas. (CCH)
" 65,975, at 68,213, 68,216 (1st Cir. 1984); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v.
National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397
(1984); Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 783 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2657 (1984); Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d
445, 454-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); North American Soccer League
v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1258-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1074 (1982); United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 787-90
(7th Cir. 1981); Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222,
223 (8th Cir. 1981); Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (9th
Cir. 1979); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Hatley
v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-54 (5th Cir. 1977); Mackey v.
National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1976); Bridge Corp. of America
v. American Contract Bridge League, Inc., 428 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 940 (1971); Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d
165, 170-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); Justice v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 379-80 (D. Ariz. 1983); Cooney v. American Horse
Shows Ass'n, 495 F. Supp. 424, 430-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Kapp v. National Football
League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 81-82 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd and cross appeal dismissed as
moot, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Molinas v. Na-
tional Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241, 243-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). But see Washington
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should be recognized that this trend toward adherence to a rule of reason
is not necessarily correct, particularly when dealing with sports franchise
relocation questions. First, the Supreme Court has sometimes demon-
strated a marked unwillingness to carve out exceptions to well estab-
lished rules of commercial conduct for particular industries based merely
on their idiosyncratic aspects or claims of ruinous or destructive compe-
tition." 3 Second, the Supreme Court has rigidly adhered to a per se rule
of illegality for horizontal restraints involving territorial allocations or
allocations of customers' 4 -a label that might well attach to a practice
by which sports teams, under the rubric of league sports, preclude eco-
nomic competition between themselves for patronage. Even the two par-
ties that attacked an NFL franchise relocation restraint in the Los
State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d 371, 376 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) (per se rule applied to eligibility rule for bowling tourna-
ments); Boris v. United States Football League, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,012, at
68,461-63 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (USFL's eligibility rules constitute per se illegal boycott);
Fishman v. Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,378, at 74,779-82 (N.D. IIl. 1981) (joint
refusal to approve of team ownership transfer held per se illegal); Linseman v. World
Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320-23 (D. Conn. 1977) (per se rule applies to mini-
mum age rule for profesional hockey players); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n,
359 F. Supp. 1260, 1265-66 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (suspension of professional golfer by her
competitors was per se invalid); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F.
Supp. 1049, 1056, 1058, 1063-66 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (NBA bylaws prohibiting qualified
players from negotiating with teams until four years after high school class graduates
deemed per se illegal). Thus, it is respectfully submitted that one recent commentator
errs by flatly concluding that "there is no example of a court applying a per se rule to any
sports league restrictive practices." Glick, supra note 13, at 69.
113. See, e.g. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349 (1981);
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221-22 (1940); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505,
575-76 (1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 337 (1897);
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898), affid as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). But see National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of
Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2978 (1984) (discussing need for cooperation in Association's
college football telecasting plan); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344,
347 (1933) (taking note of peculiar conditions and economic breakdown in bituminous
coal industry). The Supreme Court has, however, recognized that the public service as-
pect and other features of the professions may permit certain unspecified practices to
survive a Sherman Act challenge in a particular factual context even though the same
practices might constitute an antitrust violation in another setting. See Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982); see also National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975). It would be difficult indeed to view a sports franchise
relocation restraint as a professional ethical norm. Nevertheless, see infra notes 373, 385,
388-94 for a consideration of the public service aspect of professional sports.
114. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (citing as sup-
port numerous Supreme Court cases dating back to 1898); see also Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740 (1984) (reaffirming, in dicta, that
"[c]ertain agreements, such as horizontal price fixing and market allocation, are thought
so inherently anticompetitive that each is illegal per se without inquiry into the harm it
has actually caused").
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Angeles Memorial Coliseum case have apparently split over whether such
restraints should be per se illegal or deemed unlawful only after a full
rule of reason inquiry is completed.' ' Thus, further discussion of a pos-
sible per se approach, as well as a consideration of all possible rationales
for a rule of reason analysis, are required.
B. The Argument for Per Se Treatment of Relocation Restraints
Antitrust cases involving the business of sports have often repudiated
per se invalidity for restraints of trade in that industry. 6 It is arguable,
however, that the decisions err or are at least unfaithful to current doc-
trine. Although the rule of reason may be the usual tool of antitrust
analysis, the Supreme Court has articulated several exceptions to that
approach and has embraced a principle of per se illegality for a number
of categories of restraints: (1) horizontal" 7 and vertical' 18 price-fixing,
whether minimum. 9 or maximum; 120 (2) certain tying arrangements; 12'
115. Compare Brief of Appellee Los Angeles Raiders at 34-37, Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (per se
illegality urged) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) with Opposition Brief of Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission at 19, 34-35, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (arguing rule of
reason analysis appropriate) (available in files of Fordham Law Review).
116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
117. Horizontal restraints involve collective practices by competitors-business enti-
ties at the same level of distribution. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596,
608 (1972).
118. Vertical restraints involve collective action by buyers and sellers-firms at differ-
ent levels in the chain of distribution. Id.
119. See, eg., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (horizon-
tal); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781 (1975) (horizontal); United States
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 37-38 (1960) (vertical); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (horizontal); United States v. Trenton Pot-
teries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) (horizontal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 400-09 (1911) (vertical); United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898) (horizontal); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312-13 (1897) (horizontal); see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464, 1469-70 (1984) (declining to overrule per se rule applicable
to vertical minimum price-fixing).
120. See, eg., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-55 (1982)
(horizontal); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 147-48, 151-53 (1968) (vertical);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213-14 (1951)
(horizontal and vertical).
121. A tying arrangement involves an agreement whereby the seller of a product or
service conditions a sale on the willingness of the buyer to accept a second product or
service. The desired product or service is the tying product, and the second item is the
tied product. The Supreme Court has indicated that such agreements are per se viola-
tions of § I of the Sherman Act whenever the seller has sufficient economic power in the
tying product to foreclose a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product.
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556 (1984) (surgery
patients compelled to purchase hospital's chosen anesthesia service); United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1977) (credit tied to sales of prefabri-
cated housing); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1962) (block booking of
films to television stations); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958)
(sales of land tied to use of seller's railroad); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
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(3) certain concerted refusals to deal; 12 and (4) horizontal allocations of
territories or customers.
12 3
The rationale for a limited application of per se rules has been fre-
quently recited by the Court. Very early in the history of antitrust juris-
prudence it was recognized that even though a thorough factual inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding a particular restraint was ordinarily
required, certain restraints were, by virtue of their nature, purpose or
character, inherently unreasonable on their face. 124 Although per se rules
"always contain a degree of arbitrariness. . . . [t]hey are justified on the
assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh
the losses and that significant administrative advantages will result.'" 25
As Justice Powell recently explained in Continental T V, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc.:2 6
Per se rules. . . require the Court to make broad generalizations about
the social utility of particular commercial practices. The probability
that anticompetitive consequences will result from a practice and the
severity of those consequences must be balanced against its procompe-
titive consequences. Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise,
but a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not suffi-
ciently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary
to identify them. Once established, per se rules tend to provide gui-
dance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on liti-
gants and the judicial system of the more complex rule-of-reason
trials. 1 2 7
States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953) (advertisements accepted only for both morning and
evening newspapers); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947)
(equipment lessor required that only its nonpatented products be used in its machines);
United States Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457 (1922) (restrictive
covenants in equipment leases).
122. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60
(1961) (trade association's refusal to give "seal of approval"); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959) (boycott of appliance retailer by manufac-
turers, distributors and a competitor); Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (manufacturers' boycott of retailers selling copies of
their designs). Interestingly, many cases in both sports and nonsports contexts have
strained to avoid per se analysis in unconventional concerted refusal to deal cases. For a
discussion of this development, see infra notes 188-94, 281-96 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 114.
124. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58, 63-68 (1911); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911).
125. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
126. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
127. Id. at 50 n.16; see also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents,
104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984) ("Per se rules are invoked when surrounding circumstances
make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjustified further
examination of the challenged conduct."); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 n.25 (1984) (per se rules designed to "avoid a burdensome inquiry
into actual market conditions. . . where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so
great as to render unjustified the costs of the determining whether the particular case at
bar involves anticompetitive conduct."); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 344 (1982) ("For the sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have
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Thus, although it is true that courts should classify business practices as
per se illegal only after "considerable experience with certain business
relationships," 128 they have adopted a per se approach to invalidate trade
restraints that reflect a "pernicious effect on competition and lack...
any redeeming virtue . . without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.' ' 29
Because the Court has decided to include horizontal allocations of ter-
ritories and customers within the per se category, 130 the key question that
remains is whether sports franchise relocation restrictions can escape per
se treatment without offending the principle of stare decisis and without
lower courts simply ignoring the teaching of the Supreme Court. In view
of the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in United States v. Topco Associ-
ates, Inc., it appears that a relocation restraint agreed to by indepen-
dently owned and operated members of a sports league may be subject to
per se invalidity.
In Topco, the Court applied a per se rule to what it considered to be a
classic case of horizontal territorial and customer restraints.1 32 Topco, a
cooperative association of small independent regional supermarket
chains, acted as a purchasing agent for its members and distributed var-
ious items under private label brand names owned by Topco. 33 The
tolerated the invalidation of some agreements that a fullblown inquiry might have proved
to be reasonable."); M. Handler, H. Blake, R. Pitofsky & H. Goldschmid, Cases &
Materials on Trade Regulation 275 (1983) ("[I]n the overwhelming majority of instances,
full exploration or analysis of all relevant factors would show anticompetitive effects, and
the few instances in which errors occur constitute a price worth paying to have an effec-
tive legal rule.").
128. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972).
129. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The Court in
Northern Pacific went on to explain that the per se rule engenders certainty and avoids
"an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history
of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless
when undertaken." Id. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 Yale L.J. 775 (1965) (discussion of per se rule); 75
Yale L.J. 373 (1966) (same).
130. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
131. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
132. See id. at 608.
133. Id. at 599 & n.3. Topco's founding members had experienced difficulty in com-
peting with larger grocery chains, and recognized that the absence of a private-label pro-
gram was a factor contributing to the problem. Id. at 599 n.3. The Court explained that
private-label products differ from other brand-name products because the private-label
products are sold at a few easily identifiable stores. The use of private-label products
allows a chain to effect significant cost economies in purchasing, transportation, ware-
housing, promotion and advertising, which in turn may permit lower prices. Thus, a
store can either sell national-brand products at the same price as other stores while also
offering a desirable, lower-priced substitute, or sell the national brands at a reduced price
if the profit margin on the private-label goods is high enough. Other advantages of a
private label include: (1) increased bargaining power for stores dealing with national
manufacturers; (2) creation of a "price-mix" allowing lower prices on special items; and
(3) generation of goodwill. Id.
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government charged that a licensing agreement among Topco members,
by which each member essentially agreed to sell Topco-brand merchan-
dise only within the marketing territory or territories allocated to it, vio-
lated section 1.134 In addition, members' veto powers within their
territories hindered or precluded new membership and further insulated
members from competition in Topco-brand goods.135 Further, Topco
members could not sell Topco products at wholesale without special per-
mission.136 Topco convinced the lower court that no violation of the an-
titrust laws had occurred, arguing that, on balance, the restrictions were
procompetitive in that they increased the ability of Topco members to
compete with national chains and other supermarkets. 3 7 Despite the
district court's detailed application of the rule of reason and its specific
determination that the horizontal marketing restraints were actually ben-
eficial to the competitive process, the Supreme Court reversed. It con-
cluded that a rule of reason inquiry was simply "irrelevant"' 38 because
''an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market
structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition" is a
classic example of a per se violation of section L"' Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, stated that even though there might have been an
overall procompetitive influence resulting from the horizontal restraint,
"Topco has no authority under the Sherman Act to determine the re-
spective values of competition in various sectors of the economy." 4 ' On
the contrary, the Sherman Act required that each Topco member have
the prerogative to make an individual determination as to whether or not
to compete with other chains or with other Topco member stores.' 4 '
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun concurred in the result but noted that
the Court's conclusion "has its anomalous aspects" because the conclu-
sion seemed to be inconsistent with the public interest. 42 Chief Justice
Burger, in a vigorous dissent, initially noted that the case did not involve
interbrand restraints or allocation of markets by a monopolist. 43 He
then went on to emphasize that the joint venture of the parties enabled a
new line of products to be brought to market that otherwise might never
134. Id. at 601-02.
135. Id. at 602.
136. Id. at 603.
137. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1043 (N.D. Il. 1970),
rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972). In essence, the benefits to interbrand competition outweighed
any diminution of intrabrand competition. Interbrand competition involves competition
among sellers of the same generic product, whereas intrabrand competition occurs be-
tween sellers of the same product of a particular manufacturer. Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
138. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
139. Id. at 608.
140. Id. at 610-11. The Court indicated that it could not properly balance the detri-
ment of anticompetitive effects in one sector of the economy against promotion of compe-
tition in another, and that a per se rule was therefore needed. Id. at 609-10.
141. Id. at 611.
142. See id. at 612-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
143. See id. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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have been produced.'"
In the face of this legal precedent, and given the fact that Topco has
not been overruled by the Supreme Court, 4 ' how can a franchise reloca-
tion restraint, agreed to by separately owned and operated members of a
sports league, survive per se invalidity in a section I case? Some lower
federal courts have not applied the per se rule,'4 but that does not neces-
sarily mean that they are correct in their avoidance of per se illegality.
After all, the Court in Topco seemed totally unimpressed with the facts
that: (1) There was apparent economic necessity for cooperation because
no individual Topco member could effectively implement its own private-
label program; 47 (2) there was a joint venture that actually created a new
product line that had previously not been a factor in any market; t48 and,
most significantly, (3) there was a finding of fact that the imposed re-
straints had a procompetitive effect.' 49 Instead, the Supreme Court, per-
haps recognizing that a per se rule will sometimes yield an undesirable
result because of unique economic circumstances presented in a particu-
lar case, 150 opted for the certainty of per se invalidity for all horizontal
territorial and customer restraints.
It might be argued that members of a sports league are not really in
any horizontal relationship, and that they are not in fact in economic
competition with each other.' 5 ' Although there is some authority to this
effect, it seems that such a view is erroneous. After all, are there not
members of some leagues who clearly compete for the patronage of fans
within the same geographic area? 5 2 Further, to the extent such eco-
144. Id. at 613-14 & n.1 (citing district court's fact findings that revealed that it would
not have been economically feasible for individual Topco members to implement their
own private-label programs); see also id. at 620 n.9 (private label merchandising offers
the public lower prices on high quality goods).
145. In fact, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 & n.27,
58 & n.28 (1977), the Court overruled the per se rule for vertical restraints on territories
and customers enunciated in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382
(1967), but noted that Topco remained good law because it involved horizontal restraints.
See also National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2960 &
n.19 (1984) (Topco cited approvingly); Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,
104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740 (1984) (dicta stating that horizontal market allocation is per se
illegal).
146. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. See infra notes 165-71 and accompa-
nying text.
147. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 599 n.3 (1972).
148. Id. at 600.
149. Id. at 610.
150. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
152. For example, in baseball the New York Yankees and New York Mets must obvi-
ously be viewed as economic rivals. In Los Angeles, it is at least arguable that the Dodg-
ers and Angels compete with each other, as do the Cubs and White Sox in Chicago, and
the Oakland A's and San Francisco Giants in the Bay area. In football, the New York
Jets and New York Giants have been competitors and, as of autumn 1984. play in the
same stadium in New Jersey. In ice hockey, the New York Rangers, New York Islanders
and New Jersey Devils are located in the same New York metropolitan area. Thus, it is
simply incorrect to assert that sports teams fail to compete economically.
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nomic competition does not occur, is it not plausible that the absence of
such competition is simply the result of trade restraints and not an eco-
nomic manifest destiny? In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc.,'" the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided to
analyze the NFL player draft pursuant to a rule of reason.' 54 In so do-
ing, it concluded, in part, that per se treatment was inappropriate be-
cause NFL clubs "are not competitors in any economic sense."' 5
However, as the trial court in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commis-
sion v. National Football League156 recognized, the court in Smith was
somewhat confused.I 7 The Smith court announced that NFL teams are
not economic competitors, but then went on to find the NFL draft an-
ticompetitive in that it unreasonably eliminated economic competition
among buyers-the NFL teams-for players' services." 8 There seems to
be implicit in such a conclusion a belief that teams in a sports league are
in a horizontal relationship and can and do economically compete in var-
ious ways. As the district court recognized in Los Angeles Memorial Col-
iseum, teams do compete for college players and free agents, and such
competition has an economic aspect because winning teams may generate
more revenue.' 59 The court also noted that a city with two teams would
experience economic competition for ticket sales and other revenue. 160
Thus, "the fact that NFL teams cooperate or act concertedly in a
number of significant ways . . . may indicate the presence of antitrust
violations rather than the existence of a joint venture that is immune
from the antitrust laws."1 61
On appeal in the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit also acknowledged that there is indeed a horizontal relationship
among teams within a sports league: They compete with each other to
acquire players, coaches and management personnel and "[iun certain ar-
eas of the country where two teams operate in close proximity, there is
also competition for fan support, local television and local radio reve-
nues, and media space."' 62 Similarly, in North American Soccer League
v. National Football League,1 63 the court, in dictum, acknowledged that
153. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
154. Id. at 1183-89.
155. Id. at 1179.
156. 468 F. Supp. 154 (C.D. Cal. 1979), af'd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
157. Id. at 163 n.10.
158. Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
159. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F.
Supp. 154, 163 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affid, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
397 (1984).
160. Id.
161. ld.
162. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984). But see id. at 1391 ("NFL
teams are not true competitors nor can they be.").
163. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
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"competition exists between NFL members in various respects," includ-
ing competition for patronage where more than one team plays in a par-
ticular metropolitan area."6
Because league members may be accurately characterized as competi-
tors or as entities in a horizonal relationship, it is certainly arguable that
per se analysis is appropriate when such competitors engage in territorial
and customer allocations. Although both the trial court and the court of
appeals in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum specifically eschewed per se
analysis, the arguments advanced for a rule of reason approach may not
suffice if Topco is given its full and literal meaning. District Judge
Pregerson, after conceding that the NFL's relocation rules might be la-
beled a territorial allocation,165 nevertheless chose to utilize a rule of rea-
son approach for two reasons: Topco was arguably distinguishable in that
NFL teams must cooperate in order for league competition to take place
at all, 166 and, because teams must agree on where games are to be played,
the franchise relocation restraint at least appeared to promote competi-
tion to some degree. 67 Similarly, on appeal the Ninth Circuit avoided a
per se rule by first characterizing the lawsuit as one that required the
court "to engage in the difficult task of analyzing the negative and posi-
tive effects of a business practice in an industry which does not readily fit
into the antitrust context."'' 6  The court then went on to argue that
teams were not only in a simple horizontal relationship. Rather, they
also enjoyed a vertical relationship with the league itself.,69 They there-
fore had to protect the integrity of the league by taking some collective
action to "produc[e] the most marketable product attainable."' 70 The
court of appeals asserted that even though the relocation rule "divides
markets among the 28 teams, a practice presumed illegal. . . the unique
structure of the NFL precludes application of the per se rule."'171
164. Id. at 1258.
165. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 468 F.
Supp. 154, 165-66 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aftd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 397 (1984).
166. Id. at 166. Yet the court itself acknowledged that even without a league resulting
from a cooperative effort, a "barnstorming" approach might allow independent teams to
play exhibitions and to compete economically. Id. at 166 n.15.
167. Id. at 166. Of course, given the national scope of most major sports leagues, each
team could simply announce its home site unilaterally and scheduling could follow with-
out any significant loss of efficiencies. See id.
168. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1391 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
169. Id. Although this Article suggests that there may be both horizontal and verti-
cal aspects to the relocation issue, see infra notes 221-44 and accompanying text, it does
not make this claim based on the teams' relationship to the league. On the contrary,
because NFL teams control the league office, there is no real vertical relationship between
the league and its teams. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609
(1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1967).
170. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1391-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
171. Id. at 1392.
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The problem with this reasoning, however, is that none of these justifi-
cations for avoiding a per se rule seems to be compatible with Topco.
There was ample evidence in Topco that cooperation was essential in or-
der for small supermarket chains to offer private-label brands in any cost-
effective manner.'72 This seemingly made no difference in the Supreme
Court's Topco decision and therefore should arguably be of no conse-
quence in sports franchise relocation cases. Further, it has been estab-
lished in some cases that the overall procompetitive aspects of a restraint
that is ordinarily per se illegal will not save it from per se invalidity.'
The Supreme Court has openly conceded that it is willing to tolerate
seemingly wrong results in individual cases rather than permit ad hoc
abrogations of accepted per se rules.' 74
For the foregoing reasons, this Article takes issue with a recent com-
mentator's efforts to distinguish the Topco case from the sports league
situation."' After properly characterizing the teams' relationship in a
league as horizontal and also conceding "the strength of the analogy to
Topco,"' 76 Jeffrey Glick suggests that "close scrutiny of the particular
circumstances surrounding sports leagues leads to uncertainty regarding
the appropriateness of a rigorous, absolute, per se prohibition against all
restrictions on team movement."' 77 Glick views sports leagues as "func-
tionally different" from the stores in Topco and concludes that individual
grocery stores can compete without cooperation and that greater integra-
tion is needed in a sports league.' 7 " He also argues that league sports
represent a unique product that would be kept from the marketplace ab-
sent a cooperative league structure.'79 In short, Glick sees location re-
straints as potentially procompetitive and he also suggests that courts
lack experience with such arrangements.18 0
The problem with Glick's analysis, however, is that once he admits
that teams are in a horizontal relationship, much of what follows is ar-
guably irrelevant if Topco remains good law, because the Supreme Court
labeled the horizontal territorial restraints there "classic examples of a
per se violation of § .'"' As Glick himself recognizes, 8 2 teams could
play each other in exhibition contests even if there were no league at all.
To the extent that league sports represent a different product than such
exhibitions, it must be recognized that the same "different product" ar-
172. See supra notes 137, 143-44 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
175. See Glick, supra note 13, at 64-70.
176. Id. at 64. Glick correctly rejects the argument that teams have a vertical relation-
ship with their leagues, id. at 61-64, but does not consider the dual distribution analogy
discussed in this Article. See infra notes 221-44 and accompanying text.
177. Glick, supra note 13, at 64-65.
178. Id. at 67.
179. Id.at 67-68.
180. Id. at 68-69.
181. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
182. See Glick, supra note 13, at 68.
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gument essentially failed in Topco, where only through cooperation could
smaller stores bring a new, private-label brand to market. Even conced-
ing arguendo the possible procompetitive benefits of location restraints, it
must be remembered that the Supreme Court deemed it irrelevant that
the horizontal agreement regarding territories in Topco actually created a
positive effect on competition. 8 3 Instead, in Topco and other cases, the
Supreme Court has adhered to the notion that the attractiveness of indi-
vidual cases should not create a basis for carving out exceptions to recog-
nized per se principles."8 4
Although sports location restrictions may be a relatively new subject
of litigation, the courts have had considerable experience with other cases
involving horizontal allocation of territories and customers in other in-
dustrial contexts.' 85 In spite of Glick's bold assertion that "there is no
example of a court applying a per se rule to any sports league restrictive
practices,"1 86 per se cases involving sports organizations can be found.,"
Moreover, most of the sports cases that do apply a rule of reason are
economically and analytically distinguishable from cases involving hori-
zontal allocation of territories or customers. The rationale for applica-
tion of a rule of reason rather than a per se rule in some of the sports
cases has been that the restraints were not perceived to be horizontal.
For example, in Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 18  the court found
that the suspension of a boxing promoter by a boxing regulatory body
was neither illegal per se nor illegal pursuant to a rule of reason analy-
sis.189 In rejecting the per se group boycott claim, the Second Circuit
183. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-08 (1972).
184. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
185. For a collection of cases involving horizontal allocation of territories and custom-
ers, see supra note 114.
186. Glick, supra note 13, at 69.
187. See supra note 112.
188. 675 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982).
189. Id. at 454-55. Similarly, in United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs
Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981), the Seventh Circuit declined to utilize a per se rule
when a trotting horse association sued nonaffiliated racetracks for alleged misappropria-
tion of property and the tracks counterclaimed, asserting that plaintiff had engaged in an
illegal boycott. Id. at 787-90. Defendants' counterclaim charged that plaintiff's rules
required association members to refrain from racing horses at meets sponsored by organi-
zations that were neither association members nor under contract with plaintiff. Id. at
787. The court below had concluded that plaintiffs rules were per se illegal and entered
summary judgment, United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp.
1008, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981), but the court of appeals
reversed, United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.
1981). In so doing, Judge Cummings explained: "At the most obvious level, (defendants]
had no intention of setting up an organization to rival [the United States Trotting Associ-
ation (USTA)], and USTA was not [defendants'] competitor in the business of organizing
harness race meetings." Id. at 788. Thus, because the purpose and effect of the chal-
lenged rules were not to drive actual or potential competitors out of business, a rule of
reason was applied.
The same sentiments were reflected in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), in which the court opted for a rule of reason approach in a suit brought by a
player challenging the NFL player draft. Id. at 1178. Because plaintiff was a player who
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distinguished the per se cases as arrangements involving attempts by
competitors at one level in the market structure to insulate themselves
from competition from others who wish to compete at the same level.' 90
In Brenner, the court discovered no such horizontal element in the chal-
lenged practice. 9' In contrast, in Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf As-
sociation,192 a case involving a golfer suspended from tournament play
for alleged cheating, the court applied a per se rule because the suspen-
sion was imposed by a committee composed of competing players who
could gain financially from the exclusion.
19 3
A franchise relocation restraint case is arguably closer to Blalock than
to Brenner because it does involve efforts by teams collectively to elimi-
nate or diminish direct competition among themselves or among them-
selves and other teams outside their league. Although both Blalock and
Brenner involve what are essentially boycott claims rather than territo-
rial division issues, they are nevertheless significant in their emphasis on
the important distinctions between purely horizontal and other re-
straints. When a challenge is made to restrictive practices that may in-
hibit competition but do not involve protection of one group of
competitors against another, the per se rule will be abandoned and a rule
of reason applied.' 94 When competitors act to preclude business rivalry
at their own level in the market structure, however, the per se rule seems
to retain considerable vigor. The franchise relocation restraint seemingly
falls within the classic horizontal category and thus there remains a plau-
sible argument for per se invalidity.' 95 After all, a relocation restraint,
was not seeking to compete with the NFL clubs engaged in the restrictive practices chal-
lenged, the court applied a rule of reason and confined per se analysis to "concerted
attempts by competitors to exclude horizontal competitors." Id. at 1180; see also M & H
Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 978-79 (Ist Cir. 1984) (rule of
reason applied when manufacturer challenged racetrack's tire restrictions); Justice v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 379-80 (D. Ariz. 1983) (rule of reason
applied in players suit to enjoin Association's sanctions against college football team).
The purported distinction in Smith can be criticized on the ground that the teams were
eliminating direct competition among themselves for the services of players and thereby
distorting market forces in the process. Still, the alleged "victim" of the antitrust viola.
tion was not in competition with defendants. In a relocation case, however, both plaintiff
and defendants compete at the same level of the market.
190. Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675 F.2d 445, 454 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 835 (1982).
191. Id. at 456.
192. 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
193. Id. at 1265-66; see also Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720
F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1983) (court did not apply per se rule after noting that case did not
involve exclusion of competition in existing NFL territory), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2657
(1984); North American Soccer League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249,
1258 (2d Cir.) (court did not apply per se rule because competition among NFL teams
was not in issue), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
194. For additional decisions applying a rule of reason to antitrust claims in a profes-
sional sports context, see supra note 112.
195. See Leavell & Millard, supra note 13, at 613-14. One student writer has argued
that relocation restraints should generally be held illegal but may be more justifiable
when a team seeks to move to an already occupied area. See Super Bowl, supra note 13,
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particularly when league members refuse to permit movement to an area
already represented by another team, precludes competition between en-
tities at the same level in the same market.
Given the apparent continued vitality of Topco and the adherence to it
reflected in recent cases 19 6 and consent decrees, 97 it is necessary to
search further for adequate justification for avoiding per se invalidation.
It will not suffice merely to suggest that sports are "unique" or are in
some way entitled to preferential judicial treatment.
C. The Arguments for a Rule of Reason Approach
Although franchise relocation restraints sufficiently resemble horizon-
tal allocations of territories and customers to warrant serious considera-
tion as per se restraints pursuant to Topco and its progeny, there are
several arguments that may be advanced to support a more flexible rule
of reason analysis.
1. The Erosion of Topco's Viability?
Initially, one might opt for a rule of reason approach based on the
at 429-30. This seems somewhat anomalous because the movement of a second team to a
city already represented presents a greater potential for economic competition.
196. See, e.g., Reid Bros. Logging Co. v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1296
(9th Cir.), cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 279 (1983); Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd.,
605 F.2d 1, 7-11 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980); Ohio-Sealy Mattress
Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 826-31 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930
(1979); Gainesville Utils. Dep't v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 299 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 966 (1978); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,
521 F.2d 1230, 1242-43 (3d Cir. 1975); Sport' Shoe of Newark, Inc. v. Ralph Libonati
Co., 512 F. Supp. 921, 923-25 (D. Del. 1981); see also United States v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1961) (pre-Topco decision similarly ap-
plying per se rule); Op. Ark. Att'y Gen., No. 81-94 (1981), reprinted in 1981-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) T 64,066, at 76,461 (horizontal market allocation by banks per se unlawful under
Topco).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Shamrock Foods Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¢
64,503, at 72,777 (D. Ariz. 1982); United States v. Dickerson Group, Inc., 1981-2 Trade
Cas. (CCII) 64,344, at 74,593 (W.D.N.C. 1981); United States v. Societe Nationale des
Poudres et Explosifs, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCt-) 64,221, at 73,864 (D.NJ. 1981); Ten-
nessee ex reL Leech v. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) r 64,073, at 76,486
(M.D. Tenn. 1981); United States v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,610, at 77,224 (W.D. Ky. 1980); United States v. Rea Constr. Co., 1980-81 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,586, at 77,125 (W.D.N.C. 1980); United States v. Countryside Farms,
Inc., 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,474, at 76,497 (D. Utah 1980); United States v.
Allied Maintenance Corp., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,431, at 76,569-70 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); United States v. Dixo Co., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 62,353, at 76,128
(E.D.N.Y. 1978); United States v. Holsum Bakery, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,215, at 75,406 (D. Ariz. 1978); United States v. Atlanta News Agency, Inc., 1978-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,991, at 74,230-31 (N.D. Ga. 1978); United States v. Diebold, Inc.,
1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,736, at 73,024 (N.D. Ohio 1977); United States v. Ameri-
can Bldg. Maintenance Corp., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,713, at 72,908 (D.NJ.
1977); United States v. DeBeer Indus. Diamond Div. (Ireland) Ltd., 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62,056, at 74,565 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) S 61,225, at 70,642 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. C.
Reiss Coal Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,082, at 69,884-85 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
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argument that recent Supreme Court trends in antitrust necessarily un-
dermine Topco's precedential value and implicitly question its continued
viability. As some recent commentators have observed, it may be time
simply to scrap the rigid per se rule and adopt a rule of reason approach
for all horizontal nonprice intrabrand restraints. 198 Obviously, it is ordi-
narily only with a considerable degree of temerity that one would claim
that a Supreme Court precedent has lost its vitality, particularly when
the Court has seemingly indicated to the contrary.' 99 Nevertheless, the
Burger Court has repeatedly demonstrated that the rule of reason is en-
joying a resurgence.2" Thus, it may well be time flatly to overrule
Topco. 201
A primary rationale advanced in Topco for rejecting a rule of reason in
favor of a per se rule was the alleged inability of a court to "weigh, in any
meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the econ-
omy against promotion in another sector."2 2 The Court therefore de-
clined what it perceived to be an invitation to "ramble through the wilds
of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach."2 This
represented an unequivocal denial of any responsibility for balancing the
anticompetitive effects of an intrabrand restraint against the resulting
procompetitive benefits to interbrand competition.
Yet in 1977, in Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,2°4 the
Court, in the context of a vertically imposed location restriction, ex-
pressed a willingness to engage in a balancing analysis, expressly over-
ruled an earlier case applying a per se rule to such restraints20 5 and
198. See, e.g., Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on
the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Weisberg, Continental T.V. v. GTE
Sylvania: Implications for Horizontal, As Well As Vertical, Restraints on Distributors, 33
Bus. Law. 1757 (1978); Comment, A Proposed Rule of Reason Analysis for Restrictions on
Distribution, 47 Fordham L. Rev. 527 (1979); Comment, A Uniform Rule of Reason for
Vertical and Horizonal Nonprice Restraints, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 441 (1982). But see Cal-
kins & Polden, Intrabrand Territorial Allocations and the Per Se Rule, 30 Drake L. Rev. 1
(1980); Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and its
Aftermath, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1968).
199. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948,
2969-71 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1979); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
201. The primary advantage of a square overruling of Topco for purposes of analyzing
a franchise relocation restraint would be the elimination of a need to draw questionable
distinctions between the Topco facts and the facts involved in a relocation case. See supra
notes 156-85 and accompanying text. More importantly, a repudiation of Topco would
also correct what amounts to a growing degree of schizophrenia in contemporary anti-
trust doctrine. Given the reemergence of the rule of reason as the primary antitrust tool
of analysis, stubborn allegiance to Topco creates an apparent doctrinal inconsistency that
engenders confusion and frustration for the student of antitrust. See infra notes 262-73
and accompanying text.
202. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1972).
203. Id. at 609 n.10.
204. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
205. Id. at 58, overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
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adopted a rule of reason approach.2 °6 In Continental T. V., a television
manufacturer that sold directly to retailers utilized a location clause that
required retailers to sell only from approved sites.20 7 The purpose and
effect of the location restriction was clearly to inhibit intrabrand competi-
tion to some extent, in an effort to improve the manufacturer's share of
television sales in relation to other brands.20 8 When the location clause
issue reached the Supreme Court, Justice Powell described the rule of
reason as the "prevailing standard of analysis" in antitrust cases. 209 In
refusing to apply a per se rule to a vertically imposed location clause, the
Court noted that per se rules should be applied only to conduct that is
"manifestly anticompetitive, 2 " and recognized that the market impact
of the challenged practice was "complex because of [its] potential for a
simultaneous reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of in-
terbrand competition., 21 1 In short, the Court appeared to reject flatly
the primary basis for the per se decision in Topco: the notion that a court
cannot adequately balance the anticompetitive effects on intrabrand com-
petition and the procompetitive benefits to interbrand competition in any
meaningful fashion.
If the intrabrand/interbrand calculation can be achieved in a vertical
restraint case such as Continental T. V, there appears to be no reason
why a similar analysis cannot be applied in a horizontal context.212
Although one might argue that in a vertical restraint setting the manu-
facturer may function as a sort of surrogate for the public interest,
whereas horizontal restraints include no such safeguard,-' it is undenia-
ble that in either situation there is potential for an overall benefit to com-
petition. Further, even if a horizontal arrangement is more likely to
result in unnecessary restraint, absent a monopoly the public is still pro-
tected by the availability of other brands of the same product, and the
rule of reason may be employed to reach a proper result. Thus, the rec-
ognized potential for an overall procompetitive effect justifies abandoning
a per se rule in both vertical and horizontal territorial and customer allo-
cation cases. The threshold requirement for imposition of a per se rule-
the overwhelming likelihood that the restraint will fail even after consid-
erable analysis-does not appear to be satisfied in the case of horizontal
intrabrand restraints.
An additional reason for reconsidering the Topco decision is that the
(1967). Interestingly, the Court in Continental T. V noted that the "great weight of
scholarly opinion" had criticized Schwinn. 433 U.S. at 47-48 & n.13.
206. Id. at 59.
207. Id. at 38.
208. Id. at 46.
209. Id. at 49.
210. Id. at 49-50.
211. Id. at 51-52. Justice Powell noted that vertical restraints may promote interbrand
competition by allowing a manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in distribution. Id.
212. See Weisberg, supra note 198, at 1765.
213. See M. Handler, H. Blake, R. Pitofsky & H. Goldschmid, supra note 127, at 550,
598-99.
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precedent on which it relied to conclude that a per se rule was appropri-
ate was not as compelling as the Court suggested. Chief Justice Burger's
dissent in Topco accurately indicated that the decision to apply a per se
rule to horizontal territorial restraints represented a major departure
from prevailing principles or at least an insufficiently explained extension
of existing doctrine."1 4 As the Chief Justice noted, the majority in Topco
relied on a number of cases to support a per se rule, none of which actu-
ally dealt squarely with the issue at hand.21 5 More specifically, the ma-
jority based its argument on cases that either did not involve horizontal
restraints or involved horizontal restraints in addition to other illegal
practices such as price-fixing. 2 6 Given that no prior decision of the
Supreme Court had held that a horizontal division of territory, without
more, constituted a per se section 1 violation, additional justification
would seem to be needed for per se treatment. If such further support is
to be derived from the Topco Court's assertion that judicial bodies lack
sufficient competence to engage in the economic analysis required to bal-
ance intrabrand and interbrand effects, the simple and direct response is
that in 1977 the Court deemed itself fit to pursue that line of inquiry in
Continental T V
In sum, the validity of Topco may fairly be questioned,21 7 and a rule of
reason arguably should apply to franchise relocation restrictions as well
as to other horizontal territorial restraints. Of course, the decision to
employ a rule of reason would not ensure escape from antitrust liability.
Rather, in order to determine whether a restraint was unreasonable, the
court would have to consider the type of evidence to which the Court in
Continental T V alluded. 21 8 Even though the relevant considerations
may differ somewhat in assessing the procompetitive and anticompetitive
effects of a sports league restraint rather than those of a system of televi-
sion set sales, the fundamental inquiry would remain the same: Is the
214. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 615-20 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). In 1977, in Continental T V., the Court relied on the fact that the ear-
lier adoption of a per se rule for vertical nonprice restraints had been a radical departure
from existing law, and concluded that for this reason a reversion to a rule of reason
standard was appropriate. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-
48, 57 (1977). The same rationale could apply to a decision to overrule Topco.
215. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 614-20 (1972) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 615-19; see also Weisberg, supra note 198, at 1766-67 (Topco's reliance on
Sealy misguided because Sealy also involved price-fixing).
217. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. See also Handler, Changing Trends in
Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 Colum. L. Rev.
979, 987 (1977) (discussing Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Topco); Louis, Restraints
Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Arrangements: Do Sealy and Topco Logically
Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 Va. L. Rev. 879, 893-99 (1980) (ancillary
restraint doctrine). For a discussion of joint ventures, see infra notes 245-75 and accom-
panying text.
218. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). For a
rule of reason analysis of franchise relocation restraints, see infra notes 300-79 and ac-
companying text.
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intrabrand restraint on NFL or NBA or NHL teams219 outweighed by
some benefit to competition on a larger scale?
If a franchise relocation restraint case were to reach the Supreme
Court, it could serve as a useful vehicle for a frank and thorough reap-
praisal of Topco. Should the Court overrule Topco, rather than attempt
to distinguish it in some way, the implications for product and service
distribution in all American business could be profound indeed.
2. The Dual Distribution Analogy
Although a square overruling of Topco may well be justified, the fact
remains that the case has not yet been expressly repudiated by the
Supreme Court and is therefore something with which the lower courts
must reckon. Consequently, it may be more appropriate and useful to
seek other justifications for abandoning a per se rule in the franchise relo-
cation cases. One alternative approach is to analogize sports franchise
relocation restrictions to dual distribution restraints. The dual distribu-
tion issue will arise whenever a manufacturer imposes territorial or cus-
tomer restrictions while selling to wholesalers and simultaneously
competing with them by selling directly to retailers. 22° Thus, such ar-
rangements involve both vertical and horizontal restraints. At first blush,
it may seem that the dual distribution litigation has no real bearing on
the resolution of franchise relocation issues. Yet, as one author has
noted, "[1]eague territorial and transfer restrictions possess features of
both vertical and horizontal market divisions." 22' Similarly, in Los An-
geles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League,'m the
court concluded that "[t]he NFL's structure has both horizontal and ver-
tical attributes., 2 23 The court reasoned that "to the extent the NFL can
be considered an entity separate from the team owners, a vertical rela-
tionship is disclosed. In this sense the owners are distributors of the
NFL product, each with its own territorial division."" 4 Although the
court's reasoning on this issue is questionable, because the league is in
fact controlled by its constituent teams and is not analogous to an auton-
omous manufacturer or licensor,22 5 the court apparently reached a cor-
219. Admittedly, one might legitimately quarrel with the characterization of a reloca-
tion restriction as a classic intrabrand restraint. For example, even though all teams may
be NFL members producing the same "product"-NFL football-perhaps some would
say that the Los Angeles Raiders and Los Angeles Rams, for example, present qualita-
tively different products. If Fords and Cadillacs are not the same brand of automobile, it
is not altogether clear that all teams in the same league, regardless of their relative qual-
ity, represent the same product. Nevertheless, this Article will proceed on the assump-
tion that the product restrained by relocation restrictions is, for example, NFL football or
NHL hockey.
220. See L. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 403.
221. Kurlantzick, supra note 13, at 189 n.33. But see Glick, supra note 13, at 61-64.
222. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
223. Id. at 1391.
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
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rect conclusion for the wrong reasons. Even though the teams' collective
control over the league entity precludes characterization of the league/
team relationship as vertical, the relationship among the teams them-
selves fits within the dual distribution-vertical and horizontal-para-
digm. More specifically, teams in a league act not only as economic
competitiors but also can be deemed to function as mutual suppliers.
Each team relies on another to supply a complement of players in order
to present the finished product to fans.22 6 Absent an opponent, neither
team can provide its fans with the bargained-for good: a game between
different teams. In this way, every league member can be viewed as being
part of both a horizontal and vertical relationship with other teams in the
league.
The significance of the foregoing characterization is simply that a
number of recent cases have been decided in which courts have refused to
apply Topco to restraints with both horizontal and vertical attributes.
Instead, these courts suggest that the nonhorizontal aspects of the ar-
rangement preclude per se treatment and militate in favor of a more tol-
erant and flexible rule of reason inquiry.227 For example, in Copy-Data
Systems v. Toshiba America, Inc.,228 the defendant (TAI) marketed plain
paper copiers, parts and supplies, all manufactured by its parent.229
Plaintiff Copy-Data was engaged in the wholesale distribution of office
copying equipment and supplies, and concluded a deal with TAI to act as
its exclusive distributor in several states and as a nonexclusive distributor
in certain other states.23° Subsequently, TAI sought to deal directly with
plaintiff's customers and to prevent plaintiff from competing with it in
various markets.23 Plaintiff, after being driven into bankruptcy, charged
226. None of the literature or case law has focused on this rationale for treatment of a
relocation restriction as both a vertical and horizontal restraint. This Article suggests
that it is the most defensible rationale for reliance on the dual distribution analogy and a
rule of reason approach.
227. See, e.g., Dart Indus., Inc. v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1983);
Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1982); Copy-
Data Sys. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 663 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1981); Abadir & Co. v.
First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1981); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Miche-
lin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, 16 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981);
Red Diamond Supply, Inc., v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1005 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Cowley v. Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 754 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980); H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
577 F.2d 239, 246 (5th Cir. 1978); Marietta Packaging Co. v. Guest Supply, Inc., 1982-83
Trade Cas. (CCH) $ 65,184, at 71,721 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). But see, e.g., Dougherty v.
Continental Oil Co., 579 F.2d 954, 959 (5th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed per stipulation,
591 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1979); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521
F.2d 1230, 1242 (3d Cir. 1975); Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d
894, 899-901 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta
Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 720 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.), afj'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 621 (2d
Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
228. 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981).
229. Id. at 406.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 406-07.
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TAI with a per se illegal market division in violation of section 1 as con-
strued in Topco.232 The district court agreed, holding that a per se test
was applicable because, insofar as TAI dealt directly with retailers, it
stood in a horizontal relationship with plaintiff.3" The Second Circuit
reversed, concluding that even though there was an element of
horizontality to the restraint, 3 a rule of reason was applicable because
the potential overall benefit to interbrand competition required that a per
se rule be avoided.235 In short, the court decided that the vertical aspects
of the restraint took the case out of the per se category, and emphasized
that per se rules should be expanded only after careful consideration.23 6
More recently, in Marietta Packaging Co. v. Guest Supply, Inc.,237 the
court refused to enter summary judgment for plaintiff when defendant, a
manufacturer and distributor of hotel amenities, asserted that its rela-
tionship to another distributor was primarily vertical. 238 The defendant
had given certain amenities-packaging business to plaintiff on the condi-
tion that plaintiff would refrain from competing with defendant for sales
of such amenities to certain hotels. Plaintiff claimed that this constituted
a per se illegal allocation of territories under Topco,239 and that this was a
fatal flaw despite any vertical aspects of the relationship. 2"' The court
nevertheless decided that "[i]n cases involving both horizontal and verti-
cal restraints the rule of reason is usually applied,1241 and refused to
enter summary judgment for plaintiff.
Thus, despite the existence of decisions to the contrary,24 2 there seems
to be a clearly emerging line of authority that rejects the per se rule in
232. Id. at 407-08.
233. Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) C
62,696, at 77,903 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981).
234. Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 663 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1981).
235. Id. at 408-09.
236. Id. at 411. Similarly, in Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp., 651 F.2d 422
(5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's application
of a per se rule to a dual distribution restraint. Id. at 429. In Abadir, a seller of urea
limited the geographic area in which, and the customers to whom, plaintiff could resell
the urea. Id. at 424. Because defendant sold urea in competition with its distributors,
there was an element of horizontality to the arrangement. Notwithstanding this fact, the
court characterized the restraint as vertical, indicated that competition might be en-
hanced by the restraint, and concluded that a rule of reason was appropriate. Id. at 428.
237. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,184, at 71,719 (N.D.N.Y. 1982).
238. Id. at 71,721.
239. Id. at 71,719 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
240. Id. at 71,720.
241. Id. at 71,721.
242. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. See also United States v. McKesson
& Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (horizontal aspects took arrangement outside statu-
tory exemption for vertical price-fixing; dual distributor could not escape price-fixing
charges by pointing to now-repealed fair trade laws that permitted only vertical price-
fixing). McKesson & Robbins may be distinguished from the problem at hand on two
grounds: it involved price-fixing, which is generally illegal per se in either a vertical or
horizontal context, and it involved judicial construction of a statute that carved out a
narrow exception for vertical price-fixing only.
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dual distribution restraint cases. The courts are limiting Topco to its
facts and are searching for any additional factors that will allow them to
avoid Topco without offending the usual rule that lower federal courts
must follow Supreme Court precedent. Although one might argue that
any horizontal aspect of a restraint should taint the remainder of an
agreement, that has not been the approach. Rather, it is more accurate
to conclude that even though horizontal territorial agreements, without
more, may violate section 1, many courts will allow the introduction of
evidence to show that the restraint also has a vertical aspect that will
allow it to avoid per se invalidity.24 3
In the case of a franchise relocation restraint, it appears that more
than a naked horizontal agreement is presented. There is a symbiotic
relationship among league members and they function as suppliers and
customers for each other in a very real sense. If the current trend in the
case law is regarded as valid, one should conclude that the fact that
teams stand in both a horizontal and vertical relationship is sufficient to
preclude per se invalidity. Admittedly, sports teams are not in precisely
the same position as are sellers of goods imposing restraints on distribu-
tors. Nevertheless, the modem case authorities should apply by analogy,
and the absence of pure, unadulterated horizontality suggests that the
rule of reason is a preferable method of analysis. Stated simply, the pres-
ence of some vertical aspects in the franchise relocation cases removes
them from the shadow of Topco and permits a departure from the per se
rule without offense to the principle of stare decisis. 2" Once again, this
would not prevent a finding that a relocation restriction was a section 1
violation. It would merely require that the court engage in a more elabo-
rate rule of reason analysis prior to reaching any legal conclusion.
3. The Joint Venture/Ancillary Restraint Argument
Another possible rationale for embracing a rule of reason approach to
sports franchise relocation restrictions is that such restraints may be
viewed as merely ancillary to an otherwise lawful business transaction-
the creation of a joint venture-rather than as naked horizontal agree-
ments. It has already been noted that sports leagues are frequently char-
acterized as joint ventures. 245 Admittedly, the joint venture label may be
technically inappropriate. After all, a joint venture has been narrowly
defined by some scholars as "a sort of 'temporary partnership'-dissolv-
243. See supra notes 227-41 and accompanying text.
244. If the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
379 (1984), it could have relied on the dual distribution analogy to put its imprimatur on
the rule of reason approach to dual distribution restraints. This would have had signifi-
cance beyond the sports world, because all businesses with dual distribution networks
would be affected by such a decision. Thus, future relocation cases may well be useful
vehicles for shaping antitrust principles of more general application.
245. See supra notes 74-82, 100-12 and accompanying text.
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ing upon the completion" of a particular business undertaking. 24 6 The
indicia of a traditional joint venture include: (1) an express or implied
agreement; (2) joint interest (contribution); (3) sharing of profits and
usually losses; and (4) mutual right to control. 2 ' Because members of
sports leagues do not share profits and losses, and because they unilater-
ally make business decisions regarding personnel, salaries and other eco-
nomic matters,248 it may seem difficult to argue that they are joint
venturers.
Nevertheless, the joint venture label may be permissible for antitrust
purposes because both judges and some commentators appear to have
defined that term quite broadly in the context of restraint of trade litiga-
tion. For example, Professor Areeda bluntly states that "'[j]oint ven-
ture' is an expansive notion without definite meaning or antitrust
consequence."'249 He suggests that the term applies to concerted activi-
ties that purportedly are designed to achieve a joint "legitimate" objec-
tive but may have some attendant anticompetitive consequences. 250 The
joint venture may be a simple agreement, a partnership or association, a
merger of subsidiaries, or the creation of a new subsidiary by two parent
companies, and its procompetitive and anticompetitive consequences
may vary from significant to negligible.25'
Kaysen and Turner view the joint venture more narrowly as "a special
problem" that may be deemed a "quasi merger."25 2 They would include
in their definition only joint participation in the creation of a new pro-
ductive organization, and they identify two types of joint ventures that
may be economically justifiable: the joint venture formed to share unu-
sual economic risks that no single firm would be willing to undertake,
and the joint venture that permits the co-venturers to achieve economies
of scale.25 3
More recently, Professor Brodley lamented that a "central difficulty
...is the lack of a sharp definition that would distinguish joint ventures
from other interfirm contractual agreements., 254 He notes that defining
the term too expansively to include any undertaking that links the eco-
nomic welfare of the parties would render the joint venture concept ana-
lytically useless.255 As an alternative, he suggests that an effective and
somewhat narrower definition for antitrust purposes may be forged by
"focusing on the factors that make joint ventures a distinctive subject of
246. H. Henn & J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
§ 49, at 105-06 (3d ed. 1983).
247. Id. at 106.
248. See supra notes 50-53, 71-82 and accompanying text.
249. P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 360, at 471 (3d ed. 1981).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 472.
252. C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy 136 (1975).
253. Id.
254. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1523, 1524 (1982).
255. Id. at 1525.
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antitrust concern-the potential efficiency gains and anticompetitive
risks of the joint enterprise., 256 Thus, Brodley offers a four-pronged test
for ascertaining whether a joint venture has been established:
[A] joint venture may be defined for antitrust purposes as an integra-
tion of operations between two or more separate firms, in which the
following conditions are present: (1) the enterprise is under the joint
control of the parent firms, which are not under related control; (2)
each parent makes a substantial contribution to the joint enterprise;
(3) the enterprise exists as a business entity separate from its parents;
and (4) the joint venture creates significant new enterprise capability in
terms of new productive capacity, new technology, a new product, or
entry into a new market. 257
In a similar vein, others have acknowledged that one could label al-
most any collaborative conduct among firms a joint venture, because the
concept is not a term of art in antitrust law.258 The definition of a joint
venture should therefore be more carefully tailored to refer to "coopera-
tion among firms, usually accompanied by some actual integration of
managerial or production resources, to achieve some useful business ob-
jective more efficiently than either (or any) could alone. '259
Thus, it appears that the traditional commercial law definition of joint
venture, which limits its scope to an undertaking among "partners," has
been supplanted for antitrust purposes by a more expansive definition
that emphasizes factors other than the characteristics of a partnership.
More specifically, the concern is less with whether there is an actual
sharing of profit and loss or joint control over all business functions, and
more with the potential procompetitive benefits from certain concerted
business conduct.
League sports may not qualify as joint ventures under the narrower,
nonantitrust definition, but they do appear to qualify for joint venture
status under the antitrust definitions suggested above. For example, the
twenty-eight NFL teams retain individual discretion over a variety of
business decisions and do not share all profits and losses, but they are
undeniably parts of an economic integration. Moreover, the collabora-
tive conduct of NFL clubs creates a new product because no team alone
can provide the public with league football. It is true that teams might
be able to "barnstorm"-arrange games with other teams in the United
States on an ad hoc basis-but it seems axiomatic that many fans would
regard this as a poor substitute for league play with its accompanying
playoffs, championship games and Super Bowl. Similarly, intra-squad
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1526 (citation omitted); see also Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures
Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary Assessment, 21 Antitrust Bull. 453, 454 (1976)
(definition of joint venture).
258. M. Handler, H. Blake, R. Pitofsky & H. Goldschmid, supra note 127, at 496.
259. Id. This integration and creation of efficiency distinguishes the joint venture from
the cartel or price-fixing agreement.
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scrimmages and exhibitions would hardly engender the attention and
rabid fan interest that established intercity or crosstown rivals create
when they compete against each other.
In essence, cooperation among teams in professional sports leagues is
essential to produce the final product: league sports. One enterprising
entrepreneur might conceivably be tempted to organize an entire league,
but capital expenditures would necessarily be substantial, if not prohibi-
tive, and the common ownership of teams that are supposedly rivals
could raise serious questions regarding the legitimacy of the on-the-field
"competition." The foregoing suggests that the new productive capacity
requirement of the antitrust joint venture definitions is readily satisfied
by the sports league. Further, if teams in a professional sports league
must compete economically for patronage with other leagues in the same
or different sport or with other forms of entertainment, the league inte-
gration may be viewed as an efficiency-oriented, procompetitive practice
that adds to the range of consumer choices in the marketplace. In sum,
it does appear appropriate to characterize league sports as a joint venture
for purposes of antitrust analysis.
Of course, just because the concerted activity may be properly charac-
terized as a joint venture does not end the antitrust inquiry. On the con-
trary, although the standard of legality of the franchise relocation
restriction may be affected by the labeling process, a conclusion that an
antitrust violation has occurred might still follow. Further, some cases
have not permitted the per se rule to be avoided merely by labeling con-
certed activity a joint venture.260 Nevertheless, it does seem to be the
emerging view that joint ventures with efficiency potential should be an-
alyzed pursuant to a rule of reason.
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System,16 , the
Supreme Court concluded that a blanket licensing scheme for copy-
righted musical compositions should be assessed under a rule of reason
because, despite its arguable price-fixing characteristics, the scheme "ac-
companie[d] the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement
against unauthorized copyright use.",262 The Court explained: "Joint
ventures and other cooperative arrangements are . . . not usually un-
lawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on price
is necessary to market the product at all. ' 2 63
260. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); En-
gine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 983 (1980); COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov't, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¢ 66,298,
at 67,286-87 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); see also Louis, supra note 217, at 889-93 (1980) (assert-
ing that Topco condemned restraints ancillary to joint ventures as per se illegal).
261. 441 U.S. 1(1979).
262. Id. at 20. It should be noted, however, that the intention to prevent unauthorized
copyright use may distinguish Broadcast Music, because federal copyright statutes enjoy
coequal status with federal antitrust law. See id. at 15-16, 18-19.
263. Id. at 23; see L. Sullivan, supra note 21, §§ 77, 81. The Court in Broadcast Music
was also careful to point out that despite the blanket licensing scheme, individual negotia-
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More recently, in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of
Regents,"6 the Supreme Court strained mightily to avoid a per se rule
and applied a rule of reason to the NCAA's television plan for college
football games. Although the plan limited the total number of televised
games and the number of games that any one school could televise, 265
and despite the obvious price-fixing aspects of the plan,26 6 the Court re-
jected the Tenth Circuit's per se approach2 67 and opted instead for a rule
of reason.26" The Court readily admitted that the restraints in issue were
"horizontal, '269 that they created an "output limitation, '27' and that the
preclusion of price negotiation for games smacked of illegal horizontal
price-fixing.27  As Justice Stevens explained, however, the "case involves
an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if
the product is to be available at all."'2 72 Thus, because of the need to
agree on certain rules and regulations in order for production to occur at
all, the NCAA Court eschewed per se analysis.2 73 Even though the
NCAA television plan was ultimately deemed to run afoul of the rule of
reason,271 the Court was at least willing to examine the alleged procom-
petitive justifications for the restraint. In essence, it treated the chal-
tions were permissible between sellers and buyers. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1, 11 (1979). This too arguably may limit the scope of Broadcast Music's preceden-
tial value.
264. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
265. Id. at 2955-57.
266. Id.
267. See Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d 1147, 1152
(10th Cir. 1983), afi'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
268. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962
(1984); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. ABC, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,279,
at 67,212-15 (9th Cir. 1984) (possibility of use of per se rule in assessing validity of college
football television contract).
269. Id. at 2959.
270. Id. at 2960.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2961.
273. Other decisions also have taken a rule of reason approach to necessary joint activ.
ity. See, e.g., Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1050-53 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 156 (1983); Turf Paradise, Inc. v. Arizona Downs, 670 F.2d
813, 821-22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1982); see also Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2740-41 (1984) (Court, in dictum, stated that
although horizontal price-fixing and market allocation were illegal per se, "mergers, joint
ventures, and various vertical agreements . . . .are judged under a rule of reason" be-
cause of possible procompetitive features.). Admittedly, these cases are still somewhat
inconsistent with Topco, see supra notes 131-40 and accompanying text, but perhaps
Topco can be distinguished as an ancillary restraint case in which the restraints were too
severe and, therefore, incapable of surviving even a rule of reason analysis. See Louis,
supra note 217, at 891-93. A more direct approach, however, would be to suggest that
Topco's vitality is further called into question by these recent joint venture decisions. For
a discussion of Topco's eroding viability as precedent, see supra notes 198-219 and accom-
panying text.
274. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2971
(1984).
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lenged television plan as a restraint ancillary to a valid co-production
joint venture.
These recent decisions reveal a discernible trend toward viewing re-
straints ancillary to an otherwise lawful integration as trade restrictions
susceptible to rule of reason scrutiny, particularly when the joint activity
is necessary to permit production to occur at all. As one scholar had
noted even prior to these cases, "courts, seemingly bemused by the label
'joint venture,' have applied a broad rule of reason, and more often than
not, have exonerated the arrangement on grounds that it was related to
business needs of the parties or was inspired by commercial considera-
tions rather than an intent to suppress competition." '  That same com-
mentator mentioned in passing, however, that "[p]rofessional sports raise
interesting problems, since they involve joint ventures (leagues) engaging
in market division (exclusive territorial franchises)." 2 6 Certainly, there
is a need for some cooperation in order for league sports to be pro-
duced,2 77 but the need for and the legality of joint sports production does
not necessarily guarantee antitrust immunity for all additional accompa-
nying restraints. The fact that NFL football or NBA basketball does not
offend the Sherman Act simply as a result of the concerted action re-
quired to function as a league does not automatically protect all addi-
tional inter-team agreements. 2 7  If relocation restraints are unnecessary
to accomplish the legitimate ends of the joint venture, or are overbroad
or severely anticompetitive, their ancillary character will not suffice to
provide protection from the antitrust laws.
The dispositive question that still remains is thus not whether leagues
are illegal joint ventures, but rather whether ancillary market division
implemented through a franchise relocation restraint can survive anti-
trust attack. The importance of characterizing the franchise relocation
restriction as ancillary to an otherwise lawful transaction-the joint ven-
ture-is simply that it brings that restraint within the well-established
principle that ancillary trade restraints, as opposed to "naked" restraints,
are not to be condemned unless unreasonable.2 79 This precludes applica-
275. Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws Some Reflections on the Signif-
icance of Penn-Olin, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1007, 1045-46 (1969). The Penn.Olin decision to
which Pitofsky refers-United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964)-
indicated that certain joint ventures involving the creation of a jointly owned subsidiary
could be scrutinized under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982). 378 U.S. at
168.
276. Pitofsky, supra note 275, at 1046 n.84.
277. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726
F.2d 1381, 1391-92 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984); Glick, supra note 13, at
67-68; Kempf, supra note 13, at 628-30. See supra notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
278. A contrary view is presented in Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act,
15 A.B.A. Antitrust Sec. 211, 231-34 (1959), where (now) Judge Bork argues that all
league agreements eliminating competition between league members only should be abso-
lutely protected ancillary restraints.
279. The ancillary restraint doctrine is discussed thoroughly by Judge Taft in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898), afd as modified,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). The use of a rule of reason for such restraints may be traced to
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tion of a per se rule and necessitates a factual inquiry into the elements of
reasonableness, which are discussed in a later section of this Article.280
If franchise relocation restraints are deemed ancillary, the implications
for joint ventures in other fields of commercial endeavor are significant.
Certain territorial and customer divisions in those industries could also
avoid per se treatment by reliance on the ancillary restraint doctrine as
developed in the sports cases.
4. The Self-Regulation Argument
The argument for application of a rule of reason to the ancillary
franchise relocation restriction is even further supported by the fre-
quently recited need for self-regulation in the business of sports.28' The
self-regulation rationale is not simply the result of a decision to give legal
significance to the idiosyncracies of sports leagues. Rather, it derived its
support from the Supreme Court's decision in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange,282 in which the defendant stock exchange required termina-
tion of direct wire connections to certain nonmember securities deal-
ers.283 Although the Court found that such termination was improper
when no opportunity for notice or hearing had been provided,284 it
carved out an exception to the usual per se rule for group boycotts.
Although a per se rule applied "absent any justification derived from the
policy of another statute or otherwise,, 285 the statutory policy of self-
regulation for securities exchanges justified a departure from rigid adher-
ence to a per se rule.286
In Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Association,287 the Fifth Circuit
seized on the "or otherwise" language in Silver and held that it was not
always necessary to find statutory authority for otherwise unlawful con-
Mitchel v. Reynolds, I P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711). The propriety of a
rule of reason approach for ancillary restraints has been recognized by the American Law
Institute in both Restatements of Contracts. See Restatament (Second) of Contracts,
§§ 186-188 (1981); Restatement of Contracts, §§ 513-519 (1932). For a critical evalua-
tion of the treatment of restraint of trade principles in these Restatements, see Handler &
Lazaroff, supra note 91, at 678-717. For an argument that Topco has undermined the
ancillary restraint doctrine, see Louis, supra note 217, at 889-93.
280. See infra notes 300-79 and accompanying text.
281. See, e.g., M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 1984-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 65,975, at 68,218-19 (1st Cir. 1984); Brenner v. World Boxing Council, 675
F.2d 445, 454-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982); United States Trotting
Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 789-90 (7th Cir. 1981); Neeld v. National
Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979); Hatley v. American Quarter
Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Manage-
ment, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see also Justice v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F. Supp. 356, 380-82 (D. Ariz. 1983) (discussing need for
self-regulation in intercollegiate athletics).
282. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
283. Id. at 344.
284. Id. at 361-67.
285. Id. at 348-49.
286. Id. at 349-57.
287. 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977).
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certed action. Rather, it would suffice if an industry had an inherent
need for self-regulation, derived from a state of interdependence and nec-
essary cooperation.288 Thus, the Hatley court, pursuant to a rule of rea-
son analysis, found that a decision by a quarter horse registering
association to deny registration to a particular horse with improper
markings did not violate section 1.289 The court emphasized that "[i]n
some sporting enterprises a few rules are essential to survival."' ,,°
The Seventh Circuit echoed similar sentiments in United States Trot-
ting Association v. Chicago Downs Association:291
There is now a considerable body of law, derived more or less proxi-
mately from Silver, recognizing that in certain self-regulatory contexts
binding rules must be developed to safeguard the enterprise's viability,
and that application of a per se standard of illegality to such endeavors
is improper. Post-Silver court of appeals decisions have frequently ac-
knowledged that in organized sports "interdependence," "coopera-
tion," and at least "a few rules are essential to survival," and have
often eschewed per se analysis in passing upon antitrust challenges to
such rules. . . . These cases provide support for the proposition that,
in the context of organized sports and sanctioning organizations,
courts should be hesitant to fasten upon tags such as "group boycott"
and "'per se" in order to preclude inquiry into the business necessity for
or precise harm occasioned by particular rules or practices.2 92
It is important to note, however, that the need for self-regulation in
sports organizations has not been perceived as a carte blanche for courts
to analyze all such concerted action only under a rule of reason. In Den-
ver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc. ,293 the court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against application of an NBA bylaw restricting player
eligibility,294 and articulated three criteria for determining whether a rule
of reason should be applied under Silver: (1) whether there is a legislative
or other mandate for self-regulation; (2) whether the concerted action is
intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with the policy justifying
self-regulation, (b) is reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more
extensive than necessary; and (3) whether the group provides procedural
safeguards to prevent against arbitrary restraints and to create a founda-
tion for judicial review.295 If the franchise relocation restraint and the
method of imposing it do not meet the foregoing requirements, the rule
of reason approach may not be justified on the grounds of self-regula-
tion.296 The Denver Rockets court found that the NBA's player eligibil-
288. Id. at 652. But see Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260,
1266-67 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (exception limited to statutory policy).
289. Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 653-54 (5th Cir. 1977).
290. Id. at 652.
291. 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981).
292. Id. at 789-90 (citations omitted).
293. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
294. Id. at 1066-67.
295. Id. at 1064-65.
296. Id. at 1064; see Kurlantzick, supra note 13, at 205.
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ity restriction did not fit within the Silver exception because the bylaw
was overly broad and failed to provide for a hearing or other procedural
safeguard for the excluded player. 97 The court, therefore, utilized the
per se rule to invalidate the challenged group boycott.2 98 Of course, sup-
port for a rule of reason may nevertheless be derived from the other ra-
tionales already discussed.
In sum, there are a number of plausible arguments for employing a
rule of reason rather than a per se rule for franchise relocation restric-
tions. In a climate in which the Supreme Court and many scholars have
been demonstrating greater disdain for the inflexibility of per se rules,
perhaps it is now time, as Justice Cardozo long ago suggested, to be wary
of "the tyranny of tags and tickets."2 99 It bears repeating that the adop-
tion of a rule of reason approach is not tantamount to judicial approval
of relocation restrictions. On the contrary, the restraint may ultimately
prove to violate the Sherman Act, but this conclusion may be reached
only after the appropriate inquiry is undertaken. Even though a rule of
reason approach will probably prove to be more economically burden-
some to plaintiffs and more time consuming, this is the price we must pay
for an equitable application of antitrust policy, which will not catch in its
web too much desirable business conduct along with properly forbidden
anticompetitive behavior.
III. APPLICATION OF A RULE OF REASON
In applying a rule of reason to sports franchise relocation restrictions,
the key question is whether such a restriction can satisfy the standards
articulated in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States,3" in which the Supreme Court made it clear that a determination
of reasonableness will depend solely on the overall procompetitive or an-
ticompetitive impact of a restraint.3 °' In essence, modern rule of reason
analysis is confined to economic considerations, and only the enhance-
ment or diminution of competition is relevant. Some have already sug-
gested that the rule of reason, as construed in Professional Engineers,
may have increased the difficulty of according organized sports the spe-
cial antitrust treatment they may require for both economic and
noneconomic reasons.3 °2
Prior to a consideration of the likely result under Professional Engi-
neers, however, it will be useful to explore briefly the historical anteced-
ents of the current rule of reason case law. The need for this digression is
that the common law rule of reason developed into a principle requiring
297. 325 F. Supp. at 1066.
298. Id.
299. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 688 (1931).
300. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
301. Id. at 688-91. More recent approval of this approach can be found in National
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 (1984).
302. See M. Handler, H. Blake, R. Pitofsky & H. Goldschmid, supra note 127, at 489.
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that, in order to survive a claim of unreasonableness, an ancillary re-
straint of trade must be no broader than necesary to protect the legiti-
mate interests of a covenantee. It is important to explain and understand
this concept, because this strand of rule of reason analysis has found its
way into the modem antitrust cases,303 and because it is a particularly
useful tool in assessing the validity of franchise relocation restraints.304
The common law originally forbade all trade restraints in order to pre-
vent public injury and hardship to the covenantor.30 5 Subsequently, the
courts began to retreat from an absolute rule of voidness. In 1711, in
Mitchel v. Reynolds,3"6 the rule of reason was born in the context of a
challenge to a restraint ancillary to the lease of a bakery. In the nine-
teenth century, English courts built upon the Mitchel foundation and
settled on a principle applicable to ancillary restraints, requiring that a
restraint should be no broader than necessary to protect adequately the
interest of the promisee.3 °7
Cases in the United States followed a similar pattern, 30 and the ancil-
lary restraint doctrine evolved and became rooted as a fundamental re-
straint of trade principle.309  Both Restatements of Contracts have
embraced the doctrine and explain that an ancillary restraint cannot be
reasonable unless it is no greater than required for the protection of the
covenantee.31° Contemporary antitrust cases challenging ancillary re-
straints pursuant to the Sherman Act have employed similar analysis.311
Thus, at least one approach to a franchise relocation restraint might be to
determine whether the restraint exceeds the bounds of reasonable neces-
303. See infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
304. See infra notes 356, 375 and accompanying text.
305. See Dyer's Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1415); see also Handler &
Lazaroff, supra, note 91, at 721-23.
306. 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
307. See Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., 1894 A.C. 535,
565 (H.L.); Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 743, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 1831).
308. See Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 91, at 726-27.
309. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1898),
af'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
310. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(1)(a) (1981); Restatement of Con-
tracts § 515(a) (1932).
311. See, eg., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082-83 (2d Cir. 1977)
(postemployment competition restriction), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); United
States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 307-08 (8th Cir. 1976) (covenant not to com-
pete after sale of business), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Golden v. Kentile Floors,
Inc., 512 F.2d 838, 845-46 (5th Cir. 1975) (provision for loss of profit-sharing if employee
violated competition restriction); Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 59-60
(2d Cir. 1974) (covenant not to compete while employed); Tri-Continental Fin. Corp. v.
Tropical Marine Enters., 265 F.2d 619, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1959) (covenant not to use
purchased property in competition with seller); Sound Ship Bldg. Corp. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 387 F. Supp. 252, 255-57 (D.N.J. 1975) (same), affid on other grounds, 533
F.2d 96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976); Alders v. AFA Corp.. 353 F. Supp.
654, 657 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (post-employment covenant not to compete), a ffd without pub-
lished opinion, 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the rule of reason ap-
proach to ancillary restrictions on shopping center leases, see Handler & Lazaroff, supra
note 91, at 695-703.
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
sity. If it does, a conclusion that it is unreasonable should follow.312
A different mode of analysis may, however, be derived from Profes-
sional Engineers, in which Justice Stevens seemingly strained to reconcile
his approach to the rule of reason with more traditional restraint of trade
doctrine.313 In that case, the government successfully challenged a pro-
vision in an association's canon of ethics prohibiting its members from
submitting competitive bids for engineering services. 31 Justice Stevens
took the opportunity to expound on the contours of the rule of reason
and suggested that the rule "focuses directly on the challenged restraint's
impact on competitive conditions."3 ' Citing Mitchel v. Reynolds for the
proposition that the rule involves a balancing of procompetitive and an-
ticompetitive effects, 316 Justice Stevens concluded that "the inquiry man-
dated by the Rule of Reason is whether the challenged agreement is one
that promotes competition or one that suppresses competition. ' 3 7 The
Court did not apply the less restrictive alternative approach, and it spe-
cifically noted that the inquiry pursuant to a rule of reason was limited to
competitive impact and did not permit a defense based upon the "as-
sumption that competition itself is unreasonable. ' 31 1 Justice Stevens did,
however, purport to recognize that ethical norms within a profession
may be necessary as a procompetitive measure. 3 9 Although the Court's
reading of common law ancillary restraint doctrine may leave much to be
desired because it might invalidate many covenants not to compete that
have traditionally been upheld,32 ° the fact remains that Professional En-
312. Indeed, in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1395-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984), the court
followed precisely this approach in finding a franchise relocation restraint to be
unreasonable.
313. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-91
(1978). Some commentators have disagreed with Justice Stevens' analysis. See, e.g.,
Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 91, at 751-55 (discussing adequacy of prevailing antitrust
analysis as safeguard against anticompetitive results); Robinson, Recent Antitrust Devel-
opments-1979, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 17-18 (1980) (lack of procompetitive virtues to
offset harms of seller's covenant not to compete).
314. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-98
(1978).
315. Id. at 688.
316. Id. at 688-89.
317. Id. at 691 (citing Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918) and Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15 (1977)).
318. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
319. Id. The Court relied on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), for
this point. The Goldfarb Court had explained that the public service aspects of the pro-
fessions might require that some self-regulation that would not ordinarily pass muster
under the Sherman Act be permitted. Id. at 788-89 n.17. Professor Handler, however,
has questioned whether Professional Engineers leaves any real room for self-regulatory
measures in the professions when there is no overall procompetitive effect. Handler, Anti-
trust-1978, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1363, 1366-69 (1978). If Handler is correct, and it ap-
pears that he is, then a franchise relocation restraint could not escape from the grasp of
section 1, even if it served a public purpose, unless it had an overall procompetitive
impact.
320. See Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 91, at 753-55. The true rationale for uphold-
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gineers is an accepted and followed rule of reason precedent and its
teaching must be applied in any rule of reason analysis.
Thus, the franchise relocation restraint should be analyzed under
Mitchel and its progeny to determine whether there is greater protection
provided than is reasonably necessary to protect the league members.32 I
In addition, a balancing analysis to see whether the restraint is more
procompetitive than anticompetitive is required by Professional Engi-
neers. It is significant to note that, even under traditional ancillary re-
straint analysis, otherwise reasonable noncompetition agreements could
still be invalidated if there were significant anticompetitive effects.
3 1
Perhaps these two strands of rule of reason analysis thus may be harmo-
nized. In other words, the Professional Engineers balancing test seems to
assume as a prerequisite the existence of some significant anticompetitive
effect that can only be justified by a counterbalancing procompetitive im-
pact. Even after Professional Engineers, courts have indicated that this
balancing exercise is unnecessary absent any significant anticompetitive
effect.323 In the traditional ancillary restraint cases it was usually appar-
ent that no real threat to competition was present, and courts needed
only to consider whether the restraints were broader than necessary to
protect the promisees. Perhaps the harmonization occurs when the Pro-
fessional Engineers balancing approach is viewed as a second tier of anal-
ysis that is triggered when a restraint that merely protects a promisee is
nevertheless too anticompetitive to be justified on that basis alone. 24 In
sum, both rule of reason approaches should be employed in assessing the
reasonableness of a franchise relocation restraint.
A. Market Definition
An initial fundamental step in any rule of reason analysis is market
definition, because the presence or absence of market power will be quite
important in determining whether a relocation restraint is either reason-
ing a variety of ancillary covenants not to compete was not that competition was en-
hanced. Rather, it was that such restraints promoted the vendibility of property and
rarely had any significant anticompetitive impact.
321. For decisions suggesting that the existence of a less restrictive alternative is rele-
vant in assessing reasonableness under section 1 of the Sherman Act, see Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 303 (2d Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 444 U.S. 1093
(1980); American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir.
1975). See supra note 311.
322. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188(l)(b) (1981) (public injury); Re-
statement of Contracts § 515(c) (1932) (tendency to create monopoly). For a discussion
of these Restatement provisions, see Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 91, at 717-739.
323. See, e.g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265 & n. 1I(7th Cir.
1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 389
(9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Optivision, Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping
Center Assocs., 472 F. Supp. 665, 679 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
324. It also seems that, given the two tiers of rule of reason analysis, a restraint might,
on balance, be procompetitive, but still go beyond the reasonable needs of its benefi-
ciaries. In these circumstances, a finding of unreasonableness should also follow.
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ably necessary or significantly anticompetitive.325 The process of market
definition is a two-step exercise requiring a determination of both geo-
graphic and product markets. 326 The Supreme Court has indicated that
the proper limits of a relevant geographic market should be determined
with reference to "the market area in which the seller operates, and to
which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies. ' 327 The Supreme
Court has also established a test for relevant product market that focuses
on the reasonable interchangeability between a product and substitutes
for it. 328 Although it would appear that these rather straightforward
Supreme Court precedents should facilitate the resolution of market defi-
nition questions in a franchise relocation case, the unique nature of the
sports business militates against a simple solution. Rather, several alter-
native product and geographic market definitions are conceivable.329
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League,33° the only case in which a court has attempted a thorough rule
of reason analysis with respect to a relocation restriction, Judge Ander-
son wrote at some length on the market definition issue.33 ' Whereas de-
fendants argued for a broad relevant market of "all forms of
entertainment within the United States, '3 32 the Raiders football club
countered with a claim that the proper market definition was "NFL foot-
ball . . . in the Southern California area. ' 333 The Los Angeles Coliseum
argued that the relevant market was "stadia offering their facilities to
NFL teams (the product market) in the United States (the geographic
market)., 334 The Ninth Circuit concluded that precise market definition
was "especially difficult" because of the "exceptional nature of the indus-
try,, 335 and found that the jury was not required to accept absolutely any
325. See M. Handler, H. Blake, R. Pitofsky & H. Goldschmid, supra note 127, at 169
n.2 ("problem of market definition cuts across every area of antitrust"); see also Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984) ("relevant market provides the basis on
which to balance competitive harms and benefits of the restraint at issue").
326. L. Sullivan, supra note 21, at 40.
327. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); see United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 328, 336-39 (1962); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
299 n.5 (1949).
328. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948,
2966-67 (1984); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571-76 (1966); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 395 (1956); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612
n.31 (1953).
329. See Glick, supra note 13, at 74-79.
330. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
331. Id. at 1392-94.
332. Id. at 1393.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1394.
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of the proposed market definitions."a 6 Rather, the court of appeals de-
termined that the critical question was whether the jury could properly
have concluded that the relocation restriction unreasonably restrained
competition.337 Although the court declined to endorse any particular
market definition, its discussion at least hints at a proper result. As
Judge Anderson apparently recognized, even if there could be both nar-
row and broad geographic market definitions, 38 the product market is
most appropriately defined not as a general entertainment market, but as
NFL football.3 39 More specifically, the court emphasized that NFL foot-
ball has "limited substitutes from a consumer standpoint," as evidenced
by the Oakland Raiders having sold out their home games for ten consec-
utive years despite "some of the highest ticket prices in the League." a
The court also focused on the fact that NFL football draws an "ex-
traordinary number of television viewers" and was able to negotiate a S2
billion television package. 34' Further, evidence disclosed that the NFL
itself views its product as unique,342 and that from a stadium operator's
standpoint an NFL team "is an especially desirable tenant" because of
higher rental payments. 43
In sum, regardless of the chosen geographic market definition, it seems
correct to conclude that NFL football is a unique product that has no
close substitutes. Both fans and stadium operators view NFL football as
a unique and separate product. Indeed, does anyone really contend that
a season ticketholder of the Los Angeles Raiders would accept a showing
of Heidi as a reasonable substitute? Would a twenty percent increase in
ticket prices result in massive defections to some other form of entertain-
ment? It seems doubtful. Even if a more narrow sports entertainment
market were proposed, it does not appear likely that NFL fans view
hockey or basketball as adequate substitutes. Conversely, it does not
seem that NHL or NBA fans would switch to football as a substitute if
teams in those leagues raised prices. Thus, because the test for product
market definition is reasonable interchangeability, a logical conclusion is
336. Id.
337. Id. This does seem to contradict somewhat the court's earlier admonition that
market definition is essential in a rule of reason case. See id. at 1392.
338. Id. at 1393-94. The court acknowledged that teams compete for fan support
where they operate in "close proximity." Id. at 1393. On the other hand, stadiums
throughout the country may compete for NFL tenants. Id. at 1393-94. Thus, the geo-
graphic area within which buyers (fans) and sellers (NFL teams) do business is relatively
small, because a Los Angeles resident, for example, will not travel to New Jersey for a
football game each Sunday. Yet there also exists a broader geographical market because,
as a buyer of stadium space, an NFL team might consider leasing a facility anywhere in
the country.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 1393.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1394.
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that NFL football, NBA basketball, major league baseball and NHL
hockey each constitutes a relevant product market.
Although some may disagree with this narrow product market defini-
tion, 344 courts have concurred in this approach by approving market defi-
nitions such as professional championship boxing,3 41 college football
telecasts, 346 major league professional hockey3 47 and NBA basketball.3 48
In fact, one court rejected a claim that NFL football was part of a gen-
eral entertainment market.349 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has re-
cently indicated the propriety of a narrow product market definition in
sports cases. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 350 explained that the proper
question was whether other products were "reasonably substitutable for
televised NCAA football games. ' ' 351  In answering this query, the Court
noted that "intercollegiate football telecasts generate an audience
uniquely attractive to advertisers and that competitors are unable to offer
programming that can attract a similar audience. ' 352 The Court then
concluded that college football telecasts were indeed a separate product
market and that the NCAA therefore possessed market power. 353 There
seems to be no reason why the same result should not follow for NFL
football or major league baseball. Unfortunately for major sports
leagues, this type of narrow market definition is likely to be fatal to any
relocation restriction.
B. The Unreasonableness of the Relocation Restraint
It seems correct to conclude that professional football is a proper sub-
market because for some no alternative is acceptable and no adequate
substitutes exist. It follows that an NFL franchise relocation restraint
will be difficult, if not impossible, to justify in so narrow a product mar-
ket. The same argument could be made for any other major sports
344. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2977
(1984) (White, J., dissenting); cf. Glick, supra note 13, at 78 (suggesting both sport and
entertainment market definitions).
345. See International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-51 (1959).
346. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948,
2966-67 (1984).
347. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 462, 501-02 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
348. See Fishman v. Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,378, at 74,762-64 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
349. See Coniglio v. Highwood Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1022 (1974); see also Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720
F.2d 772, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1983) (professional football found to be relevant market), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2657 (1984); North American Soccer League v. National Football
League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1260 (2d Cir.) (sports capital and skill held to be relevant mar-
ket), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
350. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
351. Id. at 2966 (citation omitted).
352. Id. (citation omitted).
353. Id.
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league. Unlike a struggling, newly-formed organization such as the
United States Football League (USFL), the NFL, NBA and NHL are all
well established. The use of a franchise relocation restraint by a league
with significant market power does not appear to be reasonably necessary
to enable it to compete. Indeed, if the market definition is narrow
enough to include, for example, only professional football, with whom is
the NFL competing? Even the USFL is not a true rival because it cur-
rently plays its games during a different part of the year, although it
plans to compete directly with the NFL by shifting to an autumn sched-
ule beginning in 1986."' 4 Neither the NBA nor the NHL faces any real
competition. Perhaps one might argue that major sports leagues com-
pete with each other to a degree, but the cases follow a narrower market
definition pattern.355
It may be said that sports organizations with considerable market
power, such as the major leagues in this country, cannot justify their
relocation restraints under either the common law or Professional Engi-
neers approach to the rule of reason. In the first instance, the restraints
appear to exceed any legitimate needs of the league members in that the
relocation rules have traditionally lacked objective standards or proce-
dural safeguards." 6 Further, even assuming arguendo that the "needs"
of the league members are not overprotected by the relocation restriction
in terms of conventional ancillary restraint doctrine, the overriding con-
cern remains the overall impact on competition. Whether analysis pro-
ceeds under the old noncompetition cases or under the Professional
Engineers approach, the fact remains that the restraints on the market
will be significantly anticompetitive and that there are insufficient
procompetitive justifications to negate this fact.
1. The Anticompetitive Effects
As the court recognized in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum,"" a
franchise relocation restraint is fraught with "competitive harms [that]
are plain." '358 The use of such restraints to perpetuate exclusive territories
insulates teams from direct competition with each other and facilitates
the establishment of "monopoly prices to the detriment of the consuming
public." '3 5 9 Further, such restraints inhibit free competition among sta-
dia that seek to lure sports franchises by offering desirable lease terms."
354. See Eskenazi, U.S.F.L Votes to Switch to Playing Fall Schedule, N.Y. Times
Aug. 23, 1984, at B15, col. 4.
355. See supra notes 330-53 and accompanying text.
356. See Glick, supra note 13, at 89; See also Kurlantzick, supra note 13, at 205 (NFL
requirement of 75% approval for franchise relocation should be deemed antitrust viola-
tion). But see supra note 14, indicating that the NFL and NBA have just recently
adopted certain standards to be employed in making relocation decisions.
357. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
358. Id. at 1395.
359. Id.
360. Id.
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At both levels of the marketplace, the anticompetitive effects are obvious.
Unprotected by alternatives, fans may be asked to pay exorbitant prices
for a sports product. Yet at the same time the owner lacks incentive for
improvement of either the quality of the team or the stadium in which it
plays. Operators of stadia, even ones with superior facilities, location
and other amenities, are foreclosed from competing on the merits for the
sports franchise's patronage. Instead, they are dependent on the collec-
tive approval of teams in a league. Finally, team owners themselves are
prevented from seeking out the best competitive options available to
them and from unilaterally seeking maximum profitability by choosing
the location of their teams. Although a particular stadium operator may
propose a deal that will lower the team owner's costs or promise greater
revenues, the franchise relocation restraint may prevent the team owner
from taking advantage of that business opportunity.
In addition, unlike situations in which intrabrand restraints might en-
hance interbrand competition,36' it appears that the relocation restriction
represents an intrabrand restraint from which little or no interbrand
competition-between league members and those outside-results. The
consumer therefore lacks the protection that would be afforded if other
brands placed a check on the unfettered discretion of those engaging in
the intrabrand restraint. This leaves the leagues free to exploit their mar-
ket power and to maximize profits as in any cartel arrangement.
In fact, if the product of the NFL, NHL or NBA is sufficiently unique
to be placed in a separate market, not only does section 1 present a prob-
lem, but a question is also raised under section 2 of the Sherman Act. A
monopolization claim may be made when a defendant has monopoly
power in a relevant market and willfully acquires or maintains such
power, as distinguished from power derived from growth or development
361. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), see supra
notes 204-11 and accompanying text, the Court reviewed a vertical intrabrand restraint
imposed by a television manufacturer whose market share had declined to one or two
percent of national sales. 433 U.S. at 38. The restraint thus enabled the manufacturer to
remain a viable interbrand competitor in an already competitive marketplace. Id. In
contrast, NFL teams are firmly established in a market without real substitutes, so a
location restraint could not be justified as enhancing interbrand competition. A newer
league, such as the USFL, might fare better by using a relocation restraint to achieve
market penetration. The other rationales advanced in Continental T V included encour-
aging retailers to promote a relatively unknown product and to invest in service and
repair facilities. Id. at 55. Sports leagues do not share these problems. Further, the
Continental T V Court noted that intrabrand restraints can prevent the "free-rider" ef-
fect, whereby some competitors will allow others to engage in costly promotion and ser-
vice activities, but then attract patronage themselves by offering cheaper prices. Id. The
free-rider effect seems to have no place in the franchise relocation cases because advertis-
ing by the Los Angeles Raiders, for example, would do little to attract fans to Los Ange-
les Rams games. But see Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football
League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1407 (9th Cir.) (Williams, J., dissenting) (mentioning free-rider
effect), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984). In sum, as the Supreme Court apparently
recognized in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948,
2959 (1984), the presence of substantial market power will make it quite difficult to over-
come the obviously anticompetitive effects of a restraint.
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that resulted from superior skill, business acumen or historic accident.362
Even though the NFL's market power may, for example, be attributable
in part to congressional sanction,363 the maintenance of such power by
market division could certainly be viewed as monopolistic conduct.
36 4
2. The Alleged Procompetitive Effects
The court of appeals in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum also identi-
fied what it perceived to be the procompetitive aspects of franchise relo-
cation restictions. The court explained that antitrust laws are concerned
primarily with promoting interbrand competition and that "[t]o the ex-
tent the NFL is a product which competes with other forms of entertain-
ment, including other sports," its territorial restrictions might be viewed
as procompetitive.365 Implicit in this statement is an apparent recogni-
tion that unless the broader product market definition is adopted, there
will be little or no procompetitive effect attributable to a relocation re-
straint. Because a narrower product market definition seems more con-
sistent with antitrust policy,3 66 the alleged procompetitive aspects of
relocation restraints are indeed questionable. Nevertheless, they require
identification and discussion because they have been given consideration
by courts and commentators.
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, the court noted that owners have a
legitimate interest in protecting the integrity of the league and must act
collectively to create league divisions, establish schedules and agree on
playing rules in order to produce "the most marketable product attaina-
ble."1367 The court also acknowledged the league's argument that exclu-
sive territories and franchise relocation restrictions help new franchises
362. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
363. See Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 784 (3d Cir.
1983) (discussing congressional approval of 1966 NFL-American Football League agree-
ment to merge and to pool television revenues), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2657 (1984).
364. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1948); Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New Eng-
land, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 589 (Ist Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 336 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
427 (2d Cir. 1945). But cf SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir.
1981) (unilateral refusal to license patents lawfully acquired did not trigger antitrust lia-
bility), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979) (failure to predisclose product innovations not unlawful
§ 2 conduct), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Mach.
Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 926 (10th Cir.) (price reductions were not unlawful use of IBM's
market power), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). The parameters of the monopoliza-
tion offense and the related but distinct offense of attempted monopolization are worthy
of detailed consideration and no attempt is made here to engage in an exhaustive
discussion.
365. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
366. See supra notes 328-53 and accompanying text.
367. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1391-92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
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achieve financial stability, create geographic diversity and foster fan loy-
alty.368 Similarly, one author has suggested that relocation restraints
promote cooperative scheduling, league legitimacy, community support,
public service and profitability.369
The procompetitive nature of these alleged justifications for relocation
restraints may fairly be questioned. Even if a broader product market
approach were adopted, none of the foregoing rationales for such restric-
tions seems sufficient. Collective action regarding rules of play and
scheduling is important, but it does not require relocation restrictions.
Given the national scope of major sports leagues, any team could unilat-
erally determine its home site and scheduling could then follow.37 Mod-
ern air travel also obviates the need for a geographic limitation on major
league sports.
The argument that relocation restrictions are necessary for the
achievement of financial stability also is unpersuasive because the goal of
any cartel is to maximize profits. The financial stability of major profes-
sional sports leagues in this nation is evidenced by significant and grow-
ing attendance and by lucrative television contracts.37 Unlike a new
league, the NFL, NHL, NBA and Major League Baseball all have had
many years to establish themselves as factors in the marketplace. Fur-
ther, why should it be assumed that an individual owner would move a
team to a new location unless it was likely to be more profitable? There
seems to be no reason to allow a group of other owners to second-guess
the efforts of one to seek a better home site. If a "stable core of teams" in
certain markets is needed,372 a franchise relocation could be followed by
authorizing the placement of a new franchise in the abandoned city. Ge-
ographic diversity could thereby be maintained without the need for re-
location restrictions.
Although sports teams do perform a public service, 373 it stretches the
notion of procompetitive effect to suggest that this supports a relocation
restriction when an antitrust challenge is launched. In fact, whereas fans
in one city may be devastated by a franchise's departure, fans in another
city are likely to be delighted by the arrival of a franchise, and the
number of league supporters may increase. It is not inconceivable that
fans in the city losing a team will continue to follow that club, while an
entirely new group of fans will be cultivated in the new city. In short, it
is not at all clear that the movement of the Raiders from Oakland to Los
Angeles or the Colts from Baltimore to Indianapolis will result in lower
368. Id. at 1396.
369. See Glick, supra note 13, at 79-87.
370. Glick, supra note 13, at 80, supports the scheduling rationale for relocation re-
strictions by positing the extreme example of the Cleveland Indians moving to Tokyo.
This seems a bit far-fetched, and there is no history of owners seeking movement to such
an inconvenient site.
371. See supra note 2.
372. See Glick, supra note 13, at 81.
373. See infra notes 385-95 and accompanying text.
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attendance at NFL games. Neither Raiders owner Al Davis nor Colts
owner Robert Irsay would have moved his team if that were the antici-
pated result.
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, despite these claims of procompe-
titive effect, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury's decision that the NFL's
relocation restriction violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 74 In so do-
ing, the court of appeals found that the jury had been properly in-
structed to consider the existence of less restrictive alternatives and to
balance procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive harms. It also noted
the absence of any objective standards in the NFL's relocation rule.375
Under either the balancing approach or the less restrictive alternative
approach to the rule of reason, it appears that the restraint violated sec-
tion 1.376
In addition, while a set of objective standards for enforcing a reloca-
tion restraint may somewhat diminish its anticompetitive aspects, 3 " the
fact remains that if a narrow approach to market definition is appropri-
ate, the restraint will still be more anticompetitive than procompetitive.
Because each sports league may itself constitute the relevant market,
even a carefully tailored restriction will restrain intrabrand competition
but will not be offset by an appreciable benefit to interbrand competition.
In sum, even if rule of reason analysis is appropriate, it does not ap-
pear that major sports leagues will succeed in attempts to seek protection
for their relocation restrictions. The restrictions currently in force go
beyond the legitimate needs of league members and appear to pose signfi-
cant threats to competition. Under alternative broader market defini-
tions, the anticompetitive impact of such restraints wanes somewhat, but
the problem of overbreadth remains. It appears that only if broader mar-
ket definitions are accepted and if the restraints are more carefully tai-
lored can a relocation restriction possibly survive a section 1 challenge.
Although Professional Engineers recognized that there may be a public
service aspect in the professions and suggested that a rule of reason may
include this as a factor, that case clung to the notion that the restraint
must still, on balance, be procompetitive. The essence of the sports
leagues' claims, however, seems to be that competition is not necessarily
as desirable in their business as in others. It is therefore difficult to see
how a major sports league will be able to avoid section 1 liability under
current rule of reason standards.
Perhaps the foregoing suggests that the rule of reason, by requiring a
narrow focus solely on procompetitive and anticompetitive effects, has
become too inflexible. Not only does Professional Engineers threaten the
374. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d
1381, 1396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
375. Id. at 1396-98. Subsequently, the NFL adopted objective standards. See supra
note 14.
376. Id. at 1397, 1399.
377. See Glick, supra note 13, at 91-94.
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validity of many ancillary restraints,3 7 8 but it lacks clarity insofar as it
does not provide any real guidance with respect to the balancing pro-
cess. 3 7 9 Nevertheless, Professional Engineers is the law and will render it
most difficult to enforce a sports franchise relocation restriction.
IV. A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVE-EXEMPTION OR
REGULATION?
Because franchise relocation restrictions will probably not survive a
rule of reason inquiry, two alternatives remain. One possibility would be
to do nothing. The antitrust laws would simply function to invalidate
franchise relocation restrictions. This would result in individual team
owners unilaterally deciding where their teams would establish a home
field. In essence, market forces would be permitted to be determinative
and owners could simply decide to pursue whatever course seems most
lucrative and beneficial. In some cases this might result in increased in-
trabrand competition and in others perhaps competition will be avoided
or eliminated. In any event, the decision would be a unilateral one and
would not run afoul of section 1.
The problem with this approach, even if it is economically sound, is
that it fails to take into account interests, particularly fan interests, that
are deserving of consideration. Although the contemporary rule of rea-
son seems to have no place for values that go beyond competition, it is at
least arguable that sports teams in America play a role that is unique and
intimately linked to the concept of public service. Further, many busi-
nesses that surround major league stadiums depend on the patronage
generated by the home team. These interests may not be properly pro-
tected under a Professional Engineers approach to a rule of reason. Per-
haps they should not be protected, in order to preserve some degree of
consistency and manageability in antitrust law. Yet any New York
Yankees fan can eloquently articulate the dismay and emotional anguish
he would suffer if the "Bronx Bombers" were moved to somewhere in the
Midwest. In short, there are sound policy reasons for limiting franchise
movement.
It seems, therefore, that a legislative exemption may be a reasonable
alternative to a simple invalidation of relocation restrictions. More than
once the Supreme Court has invited Congress to alter antitrust principles
legislatively when the Court's attempts to preserve consistency and cer-
tainty have yielded arguably undesirable results.3 81 In some cases, Con-
378. See Handler & Lazaroff, supra note 91, at 754.
379. Id. at 755. This presents an especially difficult problem in the context of rule of
reason analysis of sports franchise relocation restrictions. How can the anticompetitive
effects on fans and stadium operators be quantified and weighed with any degree of cer-
tainty against the alleged procompetitive benefits to be derived by leagues in relation to
other forms of entertainment?
380. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 354-55 (1982)
(Congress should reconsider per se rule when conduct has procompetitive effect); Na-
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gress has responded by creating exemptions for certain industries, 38' and
such legislative proposals have been suggested for sports franchise reloca-
tion restrictions.382 Certainly a flat exemption for franchise relocation
restraints would obviate the need for protracted litigation and would cre-
ate considerable certainty. It would also allow sports fanatics to rest
more comfortably, secure in the belief that today's Los Angeles Lakers
will not tomorrow be the Oshkosh Lakers. 383
The problem with a blanket exemption, however, is that it would pro-
tect, with no quid pro quo, behavior that is anticompetitive and contrary
to prevailing antitrust policy. Thus, a middle ground must be found be-
tween strict section 1 enforcement and absolute exemption. Given the
current deregulation environment in the United States,38 the following
proposal is offered with some trepidation. Nonetheless, it appears to be
the best way to balance the competing public interest and antitrust poli-
cies. In short, it seems appropriate to permit restraints on sports
franchise movement, but only in conjunction with administrative over-
sight to ensure that all relevant interests are protected. A blanket exemp-
tion would allow league members to pursue solely their own economic
self-interest in making joint decisions about franchise locations. Use of
an administrative agency to review franchise relocation requests on the
other hand, would permit an objective and neutral body to consider not
tional Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978) (exemp-
tions for monopolies with "special characteristics" better addressed by Congress); United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972) (if Congress determines
predictability unimportant then it can make per se rules inapplicable in some cases);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940) (any change in Sher-
man Act must be made by Congress); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 398 (1927) (court should not adopt uncertain test in "absence of express
legislation").
381. See, eg., Newspaper Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-353, §§ 1-5, 84 Stat. 466,
466-67 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982)) (newspaper joint operating
agreements); McCarron-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, §§ 1-5, 59 Stat. 33, 33-34 (1945) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)) (insurance); Copper-Volstead Act, ch. 57,
§§ 1-2, 42 Stat. 388, 388-89 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1982)) (agricultural
cooperatives); Reed-Bulwinkle Act, ch. 104, § 5, 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10706 (1982)) (rail and motor carrier rate-fixing bureaus).
382. See, e.g., S. 1078, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Major League Team Franchise
Stability Act of 1983 to establish standards for determining when a team may move,
including a requirement of a one year notice to local government); H.R. 3841, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (same); S. 1036, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Sports Community
Protection and Stability Act of 1983 to grant limited antitrust exemption to professional
leagues to permit franchise relocation restraints); H.R. 2041, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(same).
383. Loyalty to sports as a diversion requires no citation of authority. As the late
Chief Justice Earl Warren said: "I always turn to the sports page first. The sports page
records people's accomplishments; the front page nothing but man's failure." A. Lewis,
The Quotable Quotations Book 262 (1980).
384. A number of industries have been the subject of deregulation statutes in recent
years. See, e.g., Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895; Motor
Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793; National Gas Policy Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351; Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504,
92 Stat. 1705.
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only the economic interests of the league and its members, but also the
economic interests of the businesses affected by a decision to relocate and
the less tangible interests of sports consumers.
Although extension of direct government regulation may be anathema
to free market supporters, it should be noted that professional sports
might well be characterized as sufficiently affected with a public interest
to warrant regulation.385 In some cases, when only one team can be eco-
nomically supported by a community, a natural monopoly justifying gov-
ernment intervention may be present. 86 In any case, under
circumstances in which league members suggest that ordinary rules of
competition are inappropriate, it seems logical that the government or
some third party should function as a regulator of potential abuses if
antitrust immunity is to be provided.387
Assuming that government regulation is desirable in this area, the
problem that remains is determining the scope of the delegation and the
standards to be employed. One approach might simply be to allow the
agency to act in a manner consistent with "public convenience and neces-
sity" or "the public interest." The agency would then be permitted to
flesh out the factors that would be relevant in any particular relocation
case. Alternatively, a statute could articulate a laundry list of factors to
be considered, including the financial need for the move, the economic
impact of a move on both the current home city and the proposed site,
the extent of fan support in the current location and the length of time
spent in that location by the team, as well as any other relevant criteria.
Any attempt to create an exhaustive list of all criteria would be difficult
and the appropriate agency could probably develop additional criteria as
its experience grew.
One recent legislative proposal takes a significant step in the direction
385. See D. Boies & P. Verkuil, Public Control of Business §§ 109-117, at 35-55
(1977). Indeed, the City of Oakland is attempting to use eminent domain as a means of
getting the Los Angeles Raiders back to Oakland. The California Supreme Court has
indicated that if the condemnation is for a valid public purpose, use of eminent domain
power may be appropriate. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 76, 646
P.2d 835, 845, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 683 (1982) (en banc). After a remand to the trial court
and a dismissal of the City's complaint, the California Court of Appeal reversed and
remanded and directed the trial court to determine whether the condemnation was for a
public use. City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 84 Daily Journal D.A.R. 84 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984). Just recently, the trial court again found no basis for the use of eminent
domain. L.A. Times, July 18, 1984, § II, at 1, col. 1. An eminent domain proceeding is
also going forward in Baltimore regarding the Colts' move to Indianapolis.
386. A natural monopoly is typically defined as an industry in which the long run unit
cost function declines continuously out to a scale of output that saturates potential mar-
ket demand. See D. Boies & P. Verkuil, supra note 385, § 105, at 25-31. Stated simply, it
is more efficient in such circumstances for one firm to provide all supply; the government
then restricts entry and regulates the natural monopoly to prevent abuse of market
power. The natural monopoly characterization for professional sports teams has been
suggested. See J. Weistart & C. Lowell, supra note 13, § 5.11, at 725-26.
387. For an endorsement of the neutral third party approach, see Kurlantzick, supra
note 13, at 207.
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of this suggested approach. Senator Gorton's "Professional Sports Team
Community Protection Act"3 ' is designed to provide a right of first re-
fusal to a metropolitan area before a professional sports franchise is
moved. Interestingly, the findings and policy section of the bill indicates
that sports franchises "achieve a strong local identity with the people of
the community in which they play, and provide a source of pride and
entertainment to their supporters. ' 389 The bill also refers to the "strong
public interest"39  in teams and recognizes that owners will often seek
relocation solely for their own benefit and financial gain.39 1 No attempt is
made to limit justification for relocation restrictions to purely antitrust
concerns. Rather, the bill recognizes the broader social significance of
sports teams and integrates values that go well beyond the limits of per-
missible antitrust inquiry. The bill specifies the factors to be considered
for relocation of sports franchises, citing, for example, a manifestly inad-
equate stadium,392 or significant operating losses.393 Further, the bill
would require team owners desiring to relocate, or to sell to someone
who would relocate, to furnish notice and reasons for relocation and to
provide an opportunity for a local purchaser to buy for equal value.394
The bill would also create an arbitration board to hear disputes and to
resolve issues arising under the substantive provisions of the bill.3 95 In
sum, this legislative proposal boldly acknowledges the social and eco-
nomic importance of professional sports teams to communities and es-
sentially gives cities a vested right to keep such teams subject to
defeasance on the occurrence of certain contingencies. If enacted, this
bill might both permit and prevent certain relocations irrespective of
their ultimate effect upon competition in some well-defined market.
The proposal of this Article is not likely to be popular with team own-
ers. Yet it seems that merely allowing them, unilaterally and without
guidelines, to determine whether to permit team movement will not suf-
388. S. 287, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S663 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985).
Prompted by the threatened move of the NFL's Philadelphia Eagles to Phoenix, Pen-
nyslvania Senator Arlen Specter recently introduced the Professional Football Stabiliza-
tion Act of 1985. See S. 172, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S282 (daily ed. Jan.
3, 1985). The bill would bar relocation of professional football teams unless they can
prove financial hardship or stadium inadequacy. See id. § 4, 131 Cong Rec. at 5285.
Other legislation has recently been proposed to protect communities with professional
sports franchises. See, eg., S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S682 (daily ed.
Jan. 24, 1985) (to immunize from antitrust laws league rules preventing franchise reloca-
tions); S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S468 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1985) (to
allow leagues to block relocation after consideration of community's interests and team's
reasons).
389. S. 287 § 101(a)(1), 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S663, S665 (daily ed.
Jan. 24, 1985).
390. Id. § 101(a)(2), 131 Cong. Rec. at S665.
391. See id. § 101(a)(6), 131 Cong. Rec. at S665.
392. Id. § 104(b)(1), 131 Cong. Rec. at S666.
393. Id. § 104(b)(5), 131 Cong. at S666.
394. Id. §§ 105, 107(b), 131 Cong. Rec. at S666.
395. Id. § 106, 131 Cong. Rec. at S666.
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fice to ensure that all important interests are represented in the decision-
making process. Administrative hearings that will permit the
introduction of evidence extending beyond traditional antitrust issues
will facilitate a broad consideration of all factors and inject an objective
tribunal into the process. This seems to be an alternative preferable to
allowing teams to reach decisions about franchise relocation without con-
sidering the fans and others who depend on their home team for both
economic and noneconomic benefits. This approach candidly admits
that although competition may be the only goal of antitrust law, un-
restricted competition may not always yield the desired result even in a
capitalistic society. Departures from the economic norm are occasion-
ally required to achieve socially as well as economically sound results.
Rather than distort antitrust principles to reach a particular result, a leg-
islative solution seems more appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The franchise relocation restriction undoubtedly presents issues of
great importance to antitrust lawyers and scholars. It appears that
claims for single entity status for professional sports teams in leagues
should fail and that section 1 of the Sherman Act should apply to reloca-
tion cases. Nothing in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.39 6 suggests anything to the
contrary. It further appears that under either a per se or rule of reason
approach, relocation restrictions imposed by league members when sub-
stantial market power exists will violate section 1. This conclusion is
buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association v. Board of Regents397 and by the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League.3 98 These decisions support the use of a rule of reason approach
for restraints ancillary to joint ventures, a development of importance for
all businesses where competitors might cooperate. In light of these re-
cent cases, this Article suggests a legislative solution that would do more
to consider the various interests at stake than would a simple antitrust
exemption. Instead, the local community interest in keeping or acquiring
a team would be carefully considered along with various other factors, in
order to protect all interested groups when franchise relocation issues
arise.
396. 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
397. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
398. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984).
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